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I. INTRODUCTION 
Markets are not natural. Adam Smith noted that mankind has “the 
propensity to truck, barter, and exchange one thing for another,”1 but 
markets require more than mere exchange, which is present not only in all 
human societies but also among certain primates.2 Rather, healthy markets 
consist of the widespread allocation of goods and services through a 
repeated and ongoing process of impersonal exchange among large groups 
of people without resort to violent expropriation or other forms of 
predation. 
Consider the example of Russia in the early 1990s. In the wake of the 
failed coup by hard-line communists, the Soviet Union formally dissolved, 
and the Russian government faced the daunting task of transitioning from 
an economy in which goods and services were ostensibly allocated by state 
fiat to markets.3 Russian policymakers, acting on the advice of Western 
economists, opted for a policy of “shock therapy.”4 Every Russian citizen 
would be given a share of stock entitling them to some fractional equity 
ownership of state-owned enterprises.5 The hope was that simply transferring 
ownership to private hands would create incentives that would lead to the 
creation of healthy markets.6 While the shock therapy did achieve its main 
political objective of forestalling a return to communism, it was not a 
startling economic success.7 In some segments of the Russian economy, 
healthy markets developed, but criminal and quasi-criminal oligarchs whose 
wealth rested in large part on extortion and allies within the state came to 
dominate other sectors.8 
 
 1. ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 11 (C.J. Bullock ed., Barnes & Noble 2004) 
(1776). 
 2. In experiments with humans, chimpanzees demonstrate the ability to trade food, 
including evidence of a conscious strategy of maximizing their gains from trade. See Louis 
Lefebvre, Food Exchange Strategies in an Infant Chimpanzee, 11 J. HUM. EVOLUTION 195 (1982). 
While chimps have this ability, however, they have not been observed trading in the wild. Id. at 
201 (“Food exchange can be thus added to the growing list of sophisticated abilities great apes 
show in captivity but do not use in the wild.”). 
 3. See generally MARSHALL I. GOLDMAN, THE PIRATIZATION OF RUSSIA: RUSSIAN REFORM 
GOES AWRY 45–70 (2003) (discussing economic conditions in Russia on the eve of 
privatization). 
 4. See id. at 58–65 (describing the motivations of Yeltsin’s key economic advisors in 
implementing “shock therapy” for the Russian economy). 
 5. See id. at 86. 
 6. See id. 
 7. See PREM SHANKAR JHA, THE PERILOUS ROAD TO THE MARKET: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY 
OF REFORM IN RUSSIA, INDIA AND CHINA 36–56 (2002) (discussing the effects of Yeltsin’s “shock 
therapy” on Russian society). 
 8. See id. at 37 (“The Mafiya controlled prices and rapidly developed an interest in 
ensuring that increases in supply that would force prices down did not reach the market. . . . It 
also controlled the entry of new small businesses, and thereby choked the growth of 
entrepreneurship in the country.”). 
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Historically, the Russian experience is unsurprising. Commerce and 
markets on a limited scale, of course, are common across time and space. 
There was trade in ancient Egypt and ancient China.9 On the other hand, in 
many societies impersonal voluntary exchange accounted for a relatively 
small share of economic activity. Consider, for example, the economic 
organization of the Roman Empire. To be sure, there was trade and 
commerce, often on a large scale.10 On the other hand, subsistence 
agriculture, slavery, and various forms of expropriation such as tax farming 
accounted for the bulk of economic activity. In human history, the 
dominance of economic life by healthy markets has been the exception 
rather than the rule. Indeed, modern economists have noted that even today 
most societies are dominated by a social model where “[p]ersonal 
relationships, who one is and who one knows, form the basis for social 
organization and constitute the arena for individual interaction, particularly 
personal relationships among powerful individuals.”11 In contrast, the 
set of changes in the economy that ensure open entry and 
competition in many markets, free movement of goods and 
individuals over space and time, the ability to create organizations 
to pursue economic opportunities, protection of property rights, 
and prohibitions on the use of violence to obtain resources and 
goods or to coerce others12 
is rare both historically and globally. 
Foregrounding the contingency of healthy markets has potentially 
important implications for legal theory, particularly for our thinking about 
bodies of law such as contracts that are closely associated with markets. An 
assumption that markets are natural or given focuses attention on the role of 
law as a regulator, a social mechanism for ferreting out and suppressing 
markets in their pathological inflection. If, on the other hand, we see 
markets as fragile and contingent, we focus our attention on a different set 
of questions, the questions that I seek to discuss in this Article. 
Contract law is the quintessential institution of a market economy. 
Indeed, historically, contract was a late arrival to the common law. For the 
first several centuries of its existence, the common law focused mainly on 
issues of personal security—what today we would call torts and criminal 
law—and the rights and duties associated with property, especially real 
 
 9. See WILLIAM J. BERNSTEIN, A SPLENDID EXCHANGE: HOW TRADE SHAPED THE WORLD 20–
28 (2008) (discussing international trade in the ancient societies of the Fertile Crescent). 
 10. See id. at 40–42 (discussing trade in the Roman Empire). 
 11. DOUGLASS C. NORTH, JOHN JOSEPH WALLIS & BARRY R. WEINGAST, VIOLENCE AND 
SOCIAL ORDERS: A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR INTERPRETING RECORDED HUMAN HISTORY 2 
(2009). 
 12. Id. 
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property.13 It was only in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries that 
contract law became the topic of extensive doctrinal elaboration by the 
courts,14 and it was only in the nineteenth century that contract reached a 
state of doctrinal maturity.15 This does not mean, of course, that there was 
no legal enforcement of voluntary, executory agreements prior to the early 
modern period. Roman law recognized a variety of contractual forms, and 
writs such as debt, covenant, and assumpsit existed at common law. 
Nevertheless, contract did not receive the kind of sustained attention 
lavished, for example, on the law of real property. 
It is not accidental that the rise of judicial attention to contract 
corresponds with the massive explosion in market activity and economic 
growth over the same period. Indeed, the period beginning in the 
eighteenth century marks a kind of big bang for economic growth.16 After 
millennia of either stagnant or modest increases in material prosperity, 
something unprecedented began happening first in the economies of the 
Netherlands and Britain and then in North America and the rest of 
northwestern Europe.17 Economic activity spiked upward and entered a 
period of sustained, exponential growth that accelerated after the year 1800 
and left the inhabitants of these nations wealthier on average than any other 
societies in the history of the globe.18 Contract law is a creation of this 
period. 
Despite the close historical connection between the triumph of markets 
and the rise of contract law, markets play a remarkably small role in contract 
law theory, particularly those theories we might label as moral or 
philosophical.19 Of course, there were contracts and contract law before the 
economic explosion of the last three hundred years, and in any case, the 
historical fact that contract law ballooned in importance with the rise of 
 
 13. See THEODORE F.T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 628–32 
(Little, Brown & Co. 5th ed. 1956) (1929) (discussing the history of the common law and the 
origins of contract law). 
 14. The beginning of this process is traditionally ascribed to the decision of the Court of 
King’s Bench in Slade’s Case, (1602) 76 Eng. Rep. 1074 (K.B.); 4 Co. Rep. 92b. 
 15. See generally P.S. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT (1979). 
 16. See DEIRDRE N. MCCLOSKEY, BOURGEOIS DIGNITY: WHY ECONOMICS CAN’T EXPLAIN THE 
MODERN WORLD 1 (2010) (“One hundred dollars as against three: such is the magnitude of 
modern economic growth.”). 
 17. See id. at 7–8 (“In northwestern Europe around 1700 the general opinion shifted in 
favor of the bourgeoisie, and especially in favor of its marketing and innovating. . . . But for 
millennia no blade of the hockey stick ensued. When ideology changed, it did.” (footnote 
omitted)). 
 18. See id. at 4 (“As a share of all the world’s population the world’s poverty has been falling 
not for two decades but for two centuries. A higher and higher share have become since 1800 
those $30- or $48- or $137- or $280-a-day folk, in the top four to six billion.”). 
 19. For example, the index in Stephen Smith’s excellent survey of the contemporary 
philosophy of contract law, Contract Theory, does not contain an entry on markets. See STEPHEN 
A. SMITH, CONTRACT THEORY 449 (2004). 
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markets doesn’t mean that there is any necessary connection between 
markets and the criticism, justification, and interpretation of contract law. 
Likewise, markets are not entirely absent from contemporary contract law 
theory. Economic theorists of contract certainly laud markets, and their 
approach to contract law tends to focus on market participants. Generally, 
however, the law and economics focus on markets reduces to a single 
concern: the efficient allocation of resources. Markets, however, are 
complex social institutions that can serve multiple functions.20 They do far 
more than simply allocate resources, and our understanding of their 
workings and possible social functions cannot be exhausted by the tools of 
the rational-actor model and efficiency analysis. 
In this Article, I hope to show why the philosophical indifference of 
contract theorists to markets is a mistake. I do this by focusing on promissory 
theories of contract, showing how they could be strengthened by focusing 
on the role of promises in markets rather than on promissory morality 
simpliciter. My thesis is that contract law exists primarily to support markets 
and that the moral and political value of markets as a social institution 
undergirds its justification. I realize, of course, that the universe of contract 
theory is hardly exhausted by promissory theories. My focus on promissory 
theories is pragmatic. I address these theories as a way of illustrating my 
central thesis, but I understand that ultimately a full discussion of that thesis 
requires grappling with other theoretical approaches to contract such as 
consent and transfer theories. That, however, is a task for a different article. 
I begin my argument by critiquing the normative foundations of 
efficiency analysis. This is well-worn ground, but it is worth traversing again 
as a prelude to the argument that follows. Markets are so often justified as 
being efficient that it can be difficult for people to think about their value in 
any other terms. In order to clarify the nature of the claims I am making in 
this Article, therefore, I want to be very clear that I am not offering a 
justification for markets based on efficiency. Indeed, when the term 
“efficiency” is rigorously specified using the tools of welfare economics, it 
cannot justify markets as they actually exist. Any justification for the unruly 
reality of markets must lie elsewhere. The next step in my argument is to 
provide such a justification. Broadly speaking, the good of markets can be 
understood in three ways. First, markets reinforce a liberal political order. 
Second, markets generate wealth, which helps to deliver a host of social 
goods from health care to religious tolerance. Third, I argue that the 
process of market exchange inculcates a set of virtues that makes us into 
more peaceful, tolerant, and decent human beings. 
 
 20. See, e.g., Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 
113 YALE L.J. 541 (2003) (arguing that economic efficiency should be the sole concern 
governing firm-to-firm contracts). 
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Having established the goodness of markets, I next discuss how contract 
law is justified as supporting markets. I do this by contrasting the support of 
markets as a justification for contract law with well-known promissory 
theories, showing how such theories fail at precisely the point where a 
market-supporting view of contract succeeds. Markets, however, are not an 
absolute good. At times they operate in ways that we should find normatively 
troubling. In these situations, markets do not provide a justification for 
contractual enforcement. Accordingly, I conclude that limitations on 
freedom of contract such as the rule against immoral contracts, far from 
being a paternalistic intrusion into the libertarian purity of contract, flow 
naturally from contract’s role as a market-sustaining institution. In short, 
markets are not a happy by-product of enforcing contracts for other reasons. 
They are the primary justification for the existence of contract law. 
I proceed as follows. In Part II, I address efficiency defenses of the 
market, showing why they are inadequate and require that we understand 
the value of markets using tools beyond those that traditional welfare 
economics and the model of perfect competition provide. In Part III, I 
discuss noneconomic reasons why markets are politically and morally 
desirable. In Part IV, I argue that seeing contract law as facilitating markets 
provides a more coherent normative theory than promissory theories of 
contract. Part V considers objections to the moral status of markets and how 
these objections might play out in contract law. Part VI concludes. 
II. THE PROBLEM WITH THE EFFICIENCY DEFENSE OF MARKETS 
It is important to understand that focusing on the value of markets is 
not the same thing as ordinary efficiency analysis. Of course, economists 
frequently celebrate the virtues of markets. It is thus ironic that economics 
itself demonstrates the difficulty of defending markets on efficiency 
grounds. If markets are inhabited by rational actors who face no transaction 
costs, then neoclassical theory has thoroughly demonstrated that the 
resulting distribution of resources will be efficient.21 There will be an 
incentive to engage in trades that result in Pareto-superior allocations of 
resources, and all available Pareto-superior moves will, in due course, be 
made. The result will be a Pareto-optimal distribution. We will have a world 
in which any deviation from the market allocation will result in at least one 
person being made worse off. Accordingly, markets are to be desired for 
their ability to achieve efficient outcomes. It is a beguiling vision, and one 
that is supported by arguments whose formal validity cannot be seriously 
 
 21. This, roughly stated, is the first fundamental theorem of welfare economics. This 
theorem states that the competitive or Walrasian equilibrium of a market will be efficient. See 
generally Kenneth J. Arrow & Gerard Debreu, Existence of an Equilibrium for a Competitive Economy, 
22 ECONOMETRICA 265 (1954) (offering the first formal proof for this claim). 
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questioned.22 The problem with this defense of markets is that its 
assumptions are demonstrably false. 
The first assumption is that market participants are rational actors. 
Economic rationality needn’t mean that agents conform to some vision of 
homo economicus in which wealth is the only goal and the accumulation of 
money is the highest good.23 For example, there is nothing economically 
irrational about the actions of Mother Teresa. This is because the demands 
of economic rationality are purely formal. To be economically rational, one 
must have preferences that are complete and transitive.24 For any choice 
between A and B, the rational actor must have a preference for A or B. 
Furthermore, if A is preferred to B and B is preferred to C, then A must be 
preferred to C. These preferences must be stable over time, and the agent 
must act in accordance with them. Economic analysis, however, has nothing 
to say about the content of A, B, or C. There is nothing irrational about 
preferring a life of selfless sacrifice in the slums of Calcutta to a life of self-
indulgent leisure, so long as it is also true that when self-indulgent leisure is 
preferred to a life of playing professional chess then selfless sacrifice is also 
preferred to chess. Thus, the rational-actor model can be saved from crude 
economic skepticism. 
The rational-actor model, however, faces a far deeper challenge from 
behavioral studies.25 Rather than attacking a caricature of homo economicus, 
behavioral work suggests that the formal requirements of the rational-actor 
model do not hold. Most of us, it would seem, do not have complete 
transitive preferences. There may be gaps between our preferences and our 
actions. Actual human beings are prone to misperceptions and akrasia. 
Furthermore, we may be indecisive about what we desire and inconsistent 
over relatively short periods of time in what we pursue.26 One minute we 
want A rather than B, but the next minute prefer B to A. On occasion we 
prefer A to B and B to C, but—in the face of the demands of the rational-
actor model—we may prefer C to A. 
There are, of course, perfectly respectable reasons to remain sanguine 
about the power of the rational-actor model in the face of such criticisms. 
First, most of the behavioral studies occur in carefully structured 
experimental settings where the surprising results—such as the intransitivity 
 
 22. Kenneth Arrow is generally credited with producing a mathematical proof for the first 
fundamental theorem. See generally id. 
 23. See ALEXANDER ROSENBERG, PHILOSOPHY OF SOCIAL SCIENCE 65–74 (1988) (discussing 
the formal requirements of the rational-actor model). 
 24. Id. at 69. 
 25. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Introduction to BEHAVIORAL LAW & ECONOMICS 1, 1–10 (Cass 
R. Sunstein ed., 2000) (summarizing research in behavioral law and economics). 
 26. See Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard H. Thaler, Experimental Tests of the 
Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem, in BEHAVIORAL LAW & ECONOMICS, supra note 25, at 211–
31. 
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of preferences—can be altered by very small changes in experimental 
design.27 One can plausibly claim, for example, that as scientific conclusions 
they lack the robustness of the laws of thermodynamics or—for that 
matter—the almost universally observed inverse relationship between the 
demand and the price of any good or service.28 Another response is to note 
that most economic decisions are made in institutional or social settings that 
militate against the kind of formal irrationality apparently observed by 
behavioral critics.29 For example, when modeling the behavior of firms one 
might assume economic rationality because competitive forces tend to weed 
out formal irrationality.30 These all strike me as fair defenses of the rational-
actor model, suggesting that, with caveats, it can still be employed without 
embarrassment in modeling a great deal of economic behavior. 
The deeper problem with an economic defense of markets is the 
ubiquity of transaction costs. Remember that in order to justify markets as 
efficient, agents must be rational and face zero transaction costs. There are 
few markets where the assumption of zero transaction costs, or something 
like that, holds. Market actors in the real world face ubiquitous information 
costs, bargaining costs, search costs, and the like. These transaction costs 
cannot be dismissed as negligible frictions. To grasp why this is so, consider 
sectors of the economy that exist more or less entirely as a transaction cost. 
Accountants, for example, exist to solve information costs by providing 
information about the present value of firms. Lawyers exist to help 
individuals and firms negotiate the cost of discovering, obeying, and 
disputing the law or else in negotiating and interpreting the scope of 
contractual obligations. Brokers of various kinds exist to solve the search 
costs that willing buyers and sellers otherwise face. And so on. Indeed, one 
study concluded that roughly forty percent of the entire U.S. economy 
consisted of private transaction costs.31 Such costs cannot be dismissed as 
mere friction contained within the rounding error of economic models. 
Rather, high transaction costs are the norm. 
All of this means that the two key assumptions necessary to defend 
markets as efficient seldom actually hold true in fact. We simply are not 
justified in supposing that the allocation of resources resulting from actual 
markets in the real world is efficient. Indeed, seen in terms of the conditions 
 
 27. See Gregory Mitchell, Why Law and Economics’ Perfect Rationality Should Not Be Traded for 
Behavioral Law and Economics’ Equal Incompetence, 91 GEO. L.J. 67, 72 (2002) (stating that 
theories associated with behavioral law and economics “cannot lay claim to empirical validity 
superior to that of the perfect rationality assumption” of law and economics). 
 28. See id. 
 29. See id. at 74–75. 
 30. See id. at 73–77. 
 31. See John Joseph Wallis & Douglass C. North, Measuring the Transaction Sector in the 
American Economy, 1870–1970, in LONG-TERM FACTORS IN AMERICAN ECONOMIC GROWTH 95, 
121 tbl.3.13 (Stanley L. Engerman & Robert E. Gallman eds., paperback ed. 1992). 
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for an efficient market, most market activity is actually an unfortunate 
transaction cost. The process of exchange, shopping, bargaining, 
persuading, building relationships with customers and suppliers, 
experimenting with new business models, creating new products, trying new 
services, and the like are all so much waste. In the theoretical construct of 
perfect competition, such activities should not exist and goods and services 
should instantaneously and costlessly converge on an efficient equilibrium 
point. It is this efficient equilibrium, rather than market activity per se, that 
is the normative goal of economic theories. In the end, however, any 
discussion of markets must assume that we are not in the world of perfect 
competition and zero transaction costs.  
This does not, of course, mean that one cannot make efficiency 
arguments in favor of markets. Nor is it a criticism of economic analysis of 
the law. The efficiency of markets can still be defended on comparative 
grounds. Hence, one might acknowledge deviations from the rational-actor 
model and the ubiquity of transaction costs but still argue that markets are 
economically preferable to alternative forms of economic organization, 
especially the allocation of resources by government fiat. This, for example, 
was the gravamen of Friedrich Hayek’s brilliant defense of markets during 
the so-called socialist economic-calculation debates of the 1930s and 1940s. 
Hayek did not defend markets as perfectly efficient.32 Rather, he noted the 
massive information problems faced by government decision makers and 
argued that, through the price mechanism, markets were better able to 
aggregate the decentralized information in society needed for rational 
decision making.33 
Likewise, the fact that one cannot ultimately defend real-world markets 
as efficient using the simple models of neoclassical economics is not 
necessarily a critique of the efficiency analysis of ordinary law and 
economics. Indeed, since Ronald Coase, law and economics has assumed 
that the ubiquity of transaction costs must be the starting point for the 
economic analysis of legal rules.34 There is a real sense in which the work of 
someone like Richard Posner is less a defense of the market than a series of 
ingenious suggestions as to how market outcomes can be improved by taking 
transaction costs into account and specifying legal rules that are more 
efficient in light of those costs.35 Indeed, the Coase Theorem suggests that if 
the conditions hold for claiming that a market is efficient, the structure of 
 
 32. See generally Bruce Caldwell, Hayek and Socialism, 35 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1856 (1997); 
Günther K. Chaloupek, The Austrian Debate on Economic Calculation in a Socialist Economy, 22 HIST. 
POL. ECON. 659 (1990). 
 33. See generally F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519 (1945). 
 34. See generally R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960). 
 35. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (8th ed. 2011). 
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legal entitlements is generally irrelevant.36 Law and economics scholarship 
thus shows us ways in which the legal system might be made marginally more 
efficient. What that scholarship does not do is provide us with an argument 
as to why actual markets—as opposed to the frictionless fictions of 
introductory textbooks—are valuable. One might take the existence of such 
markets as given and ask how they might be improved so as to be more 
efficient, but there is no reason why—given a different set of historical 
accidents—one might not take the hierarchical organized economy of the 
Roman Empire or some other economic system as given and use law and 
economics analysis to show how it could be made marginally more efficient. 
Even if markets are efficient, the normative credentials of efficiency as a 
policy goal are open to serious question. When one makes the claim that 
markets—given certain conditions—are efficient, it is important to 
understand exactly what is meant by “efficient.” In this claim, what it means 
for a market to be efficient is that it will result in a Pareto-optimal allocation 
of resources. There is no reason, however, to suppose that bare Pareto 
optimality is normatively desirable.37 The allocation of resources resulting 
from theft can be Pareto-optimal. If a wealthy glutton steals the last morsel 
of food from a starving child, the allocation will be efficient so long as the 
glutton prefers having the morsel of food to not having the morsel of food. 
Taking the morsel from the glutton and returning it to the child will, after 
all, result in the glutton being worse off, violating the Pareto requirement. 
Of course, once the morsel is returned to the child, the restored allocation 
may itself also be Pareto-optimal. This analysis suggests, however, that the 
mere fact that a state of affairs is Pareto-optimal tells us relatively little about 
its ultimate desirability. Certainly, a defense of markets based on their Pareto 
optimality, without more, has very little to recommend it, even if the 
implausible assumptions of zero transaction costs and perfect rationality are 
satisfied. 
Finally, it is worth noting that the utilitarian foundations of welfarist 
justifications for efficiency are open to serious question. The discussion of 
efficiency above speaks in terms of preferences and their satisfaction. The 
idea is that the satisfaction of a preference, all else being equal, is a good 
thing that increases human welfare or is otherwise normatively desirable. 
The notion of efficiency, however, is indifferent to the substantive content of 
these preferences. Rather, that notion takes preferences to be exogenous to 
the analysis, a pre-existing fact about the universe. This approach, however, 
runs counter to our moral common sense. Ordinarily, we do not regard 
preferences as matters of moral indifference that present a merely technical 
 
 36. See Coase, supra note 34, at 6–8 (noting that in a world of zero transaction costs any 
initial allocation of an entitlement will result in an efficient final allocation). 
 37. See Jules L. Coleman, Risks and Wrongs, 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 637, 637–38 
(1992). 
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problem of aggregation and maximization. Rather, we regard some 
preferences as good and others as bad. The person with a preference for 
sadistic killing is not merely a person with a taste that happens to have a 
negative externality. He is a moral monster, and we are right to regard him 
as such. Likewise, we tend to believe that certain preferences are higher or 
nobler than others. A person who desires to help or relieve the suffering of 
others is, for that reason, deserving of praise that is not due to someone with 
a preference for playing video games. Efficiency analysis, however, provides 
us with no traction in making such judgments, but rather, requires that we 
take all preferences as given and unquestionable. 
In short, in thinking about the value of the actual markets that we 
encounter in the real world, traditional economic analysis in its normative 
guise provides us with less guidance than one might initially assume. At best, 
actual markets emerge from the argument as a kind of compromised version 
of a theoretical ideal. Most strikingly, many of the quintessential activities of 
the market, such as bargaining, exchange, experimentation, and the like, 
are revealed as so many transaction costs; perhaps inevitable but ultimately 
wasteful. Economics, whatever its virtues as a theory of social explanation 
(and I believe it has many virtues) or as a method for prescribing marginal 
improvements to institutions, does not provide a strong defense of markets 
in general. 
III. THE NON-EFFICIENCY CASE FOR MARKETS 
As mentioned above, markets are most often defended as mechanisms 
for the efficient allocation of resources. The process of widespread 
exchange, however, yields greater benefits than conversion on an efficient 
equilibrium point. Indeed, in many ways efficiency in the abstract sense 
championed by economic analysis of the law is among the least of the many 
virtues of markets. These other values can be divided into three basic 
spheres: politics, wealth, and virtue. These spheres are necessarily related to 
one another, but for ease of exposition, I will treat each one separately. 
A. POLITICS 
Eighteenth-century writers often spoke of the political benefits of a 
commercial society.38 Thinkers, such as Montesquieu and Adam Smith, 
contrasted the emerging world of commerce with the largely precommercial 
past.39 They contrasted commercial society with the ethos of the feudal past, 
 
 38. See ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, THE PASSIONS AND THE INTERESTS: POLITICAL ARGUMENTS 
FOR CAPITALISM BEFORE ITS TRIUMPH 70–93 (1977) (discussing eighteenth-century debates over 
commerce). See generally COMMERCE, CULTURE, AND LIBERTY: READINGS ON CAPITALISM BEFORE 
ADAM SMITH (Henry C. Clark ed., 2003) (collecting sources on the eighteenth-century debates 
over commerce). 
 39. See HIRSCHMAN, supra note 38, at 9–12 (discussing “The Idea of Glory and Its 
Downfall”). 
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in which bravery, loyalty, obedience to hierarchy, and the like were 
exalted.40 For these early evangelists of the market, commerce did much 
more than make men rich. It made them “gentle,” not simply in the sense of 
being less violent but also in the sense of being more refined, thoughtful, 
and tolerant. In commercial society, men were more sociable, the arts and 
philosophy could flourish more freely, the peace of the commonwealth was 
less likely to be excited by the violence of religious fanaticism, and true piety 
could develop without the threat of coercion from a state whose energy was 
devoted to the cultivation of commerce rather than orthodoxy.41 To be sure, 
these theorists worried about the negative effects of commerce. They spoke 
of the vices of luxury that wealth could bring, but on the whole, they viewed 
the growth of markets as a beneficent moral force in society.42 
These arguments can be transposed into the language of modern 
political philosophy. Much of liberal theory, for example, insists on the need 
to distinguish between the right—the minimum demands that justice places 
on each agent to respect the rights of other agents—and the good—the 
comprehensive systems of beliefs about final moral ends that agents hold.43 
The value of liberal political institutions, on this view, lies in their ability to 
provide a peaceful modus vivendi for those with sharply differing visions of 
the good. The liberal state should respect the demands of the right while 
remaining neutral with regard to competing visions of the good. Ironically, 
however, in pluralistic societies, the market provides a much better example 
of cooperation among those with competing visions of the good than does 
politics. Despite the dream of a neutral state whose actions are justified by a 
thin, public reason, politics as it is actually practiced in liberal societies is 
frequently bitter, polarizing, and acrimonious. In the marketplace, however, 
those with sharply competing political, moral, and religious visions 
 
 40. See id. 
 41. See id. at 63–66 (discussing “Money-Making as a Calm Passion”); MONTESQUIEU, THE 
SPIRIT OF THE LAWS bk. XX, ch. 2, at 338 (Anne M. Cohler et al. eds. & trans., Cambridge Univ. 
Press 1989) (1748) (“The natural effect of commerce is to lead to peace. Two nations that 
trade with each other become reciprocally dependent; if one has an interest in buying, the 
other has an interest in selling, and thus all unions are founded on mutual needs.”). 
 42. See 2 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF 
NATIONS 794 (R.H. Campbell et al. eds., LibertyClassics 1981) (1776) (“In every civilized 
society, in every society where the distinction of ranks has once been completely established, 
there have been always two different schemes or systems of morality current at the same time; of 
which the one may be called the strict or austere; the other the liberal or, if you will, the loose 
system. . . . In the liberal or loose system, luxury, wanton and even disorderly mirth, the pursuit 
of pleasure to some degree of intemperance, the breach of chastity, at least in one of the two 
sexes . . . are generally treated with a good deal of indulgence . . . .”). 
 43. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 392–96 (rev. ed. 1999) (discussing the 
distinction between the right and the good); see also STEPHEN MULHALL & ADAM SWIFT, LIBERALS 
AND COMMUNITARIANS 31–33 (1992) (same). 
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peacefully cooperate.44 This cooperation is so pervasive that we seldom 
realize how remarkable it is. Well-functioning markets are perhaps of the 
single most effective social practice for managing the pluralism of 
incommensurable beliefs. 
Liberal political theory has searched for a solution to the problem of 
apparently incommensurable and irreducible moral pluralism through some 
kind of discursive mechanism. For example, the idea of public reason 
imagines a coercive state, but one whose ability to engage in legitimate 
collective decisions is sharply limited by the kinds of reasons that may be 
offered in support of those decisions.45 In effect, the boundaries of a certain 
way of talking become the boundaries of legitimate collective action via the 
state, and the boundaries of the discussion are set in such a way as to 
manage the pluralism of ultimate moral or political commitments. The 
problem with this way of managing pluralism is that as a practical matter it 
requires citizens to engage in an epistemic and rhetorical continence in 
which their deepest personal convictions and sense of identity are 
systematically suppressed in public.46 Regardless of the ultimate rightness of 
such a strategy, it has not proved especially successful in practice.47 Modern 
politics, even in well-functioning liberal democracies, frequently and 
inevitably features appeals beyond a thin conception of public reason.48 
Another alternative is to simply limit the reach of the state—and 
therefore the destructive possibilities of politically clashing moral 
absolutisms—by carving out a private realm that is to be free of political 
intrusion. Much of the traditional theory of individual rights is devoted to 
defining the limits of this protected space. Likewise, much of constitutional 
theory is devoted to the design of institutions that will prevent the state from 
growing too large and assertive at the expense of the protected sphere of the 
individual. Laudable as such efforts are, however, they are insufficient to 
accomplish the goals to which they are set. Historically, well-specified 
 
 44. See JULES L. COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS 5 (1992) (“Markets maximize social 
interaction without individuals first being required to agree upon fundamental social values or 
to share a conception of the good or of the constitutive elements of the good life.”). 
 45. See JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 212–54 (1993) (setting forth a defense of the 
idea of public reason). 
 46. See STEVEN D. SMITH, THE DISENCHANTMENT OF SECULAR DISCOURSE 13–18 (2010) 
(summarizing the idea of public reason and contrasting it with earlier, more ambitious ideas of 
reason); see also RAWLS, supra note 45, at 216–20 (defending the idea of public reason). 
 47. See SMITH, supra note 46, at 26–27 (“Our modern secular vocabulary purports to 
render inadmissible notions such as those that animated premodern moral discourse—notions 
about a purposive cosmos, or a teleological nature stocked with Aristotelian ‘final causes,’ or a 
providential design. But if our deepest convictions rely on such notions, and if these convictions 
lose their sense and substance when divorced from such notions, then perhaps we have little 
choice except to smuggle such notions into the conversation—to introduce them incognito 
under some sort of secular disguise.”). 
 48. See id. at 27 (“Such smuggling is, I happen to think, ubiquitous in modern public 
discourse.”). 
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theories of rights and well-designed political institutions, standing alone, 
have proven insufficient to prevent either the chaos of clashing moral visions 
or the capture of the coercive capacity of the state by one totalizing moral 
vision. Rather, the apparatus of rights and constitutional design must always 
rest on broader foundation of social practices that facilitate the liberal 
order. 
Markets provide a powerful response to the dilemma of moral pluralism 
within a liberal order. As Albert Hirschman observed, the pre-classical 
theorists of the market saw commerce as harnessing people’s interests to 
control their passions.49 One can think of intense moral convictions as a 
kind of passion, a reason and a motivation that tends to push a believer 
towards extreme forms of action. Market participants, however, do not 
appeal to the passions, convictions, and deepest beliefs of those with whom 
they deal. As Adam Smith observed, “It is not from the benevolence of the 
butcher, the brewer, or the baker that we expect our dinner, but from their 
regard to their own interest.”50 In offering a means by which market 
participants may advance their interests by cooperating with those whose 
beliefs they may otherwise despise, markets provide powerful incentives to 
control the forces that disturb the sleep of liberal theorists. One can see the 
effectiveness of this approach by considering the relative ease with which 
those who have sharply differing religious, political, and moral convictions 
work peacefully with one another as employees of a private corporation or 
contracting partners in a market exchange. The appeal to the interests, as 
Hirschman puts it, proves far more powerful than an appeal to the 
rhetorical abstemiousness of public reason. 
Markets also are an effective way of limiting the reach of the state. If 
rights seek to define the parameters of what the state may legitimately do to 
its citizens, and if constitutional design seeks to limit the state through its 
internal architecture, then the market provides a resisting medium in which 
an expanding state must move if it is to aggrandize itself at the expense of 
others. Of course, in practice the market is interpenetrated by the state, 
which provides such basic institutions as protection for private property and 
contract law. Markets may exist in the absence of such institutions, but they 
are likely to be far less robust than their formal counterparts.51 Nevertheless, 
the market provides at least a semi-autonomous realm in which concerns 
other than those that drive politics are the dominant motivations. The result 
is an endlessly complex web of relationships and interests between 
innumerable private parties that will tend to resist the encroachments of the 
 
 49. See HIRSCHMAN, supra note 38, at 31–42 (discussing “‘Interest’ and ‘Interests’ as 
Tamers of the Passions”). 
 50. SMITH, supra note 1, at 12. 
 51. See HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL: WHY CAPITALISM TRIUMPHS IN THE 
WEST AND FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE (2000) (discussing the fragility of the informal markets in 
which the poor of the developing world struggle). 
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state as its expansion upsets the equilibrium of these relationships. Likewise, 
in order to foster markets, the state may limit arbitrary and intrusive action 
for purely instrumental reasons. Robust markets may thus serve to provide 
part of the social background that can render the formal structure of rights 
and constitutional protections effective. 
The legal history of early Virginia provides an example of how this can 
be so. The Virginia Company was set up as a profit-making enterprise. 
Initially, it pursued a strategy of extracting as much labor as possible from 
colonists through a military-style system of hierarchical command and 
arbitrary rule.52 When this approach proved an economic failure, however, 
the colony shifted to a less hierarchical, more rule-bound regime in order to 
foster greater investment and commercial activity by providing legal 
predictability.53 The result was a move toward a legal system more infused 
with rule-of-law values, such as legal consistency and respect by the 
government for the legal rights of its subjects.54 As William E. Nelson has 
written: 
Tyranny, liberty, and consent are the wrong concepts through 
which to understand why the legal system of seventeenth-century 
Virginia changed. Although some of the substantive law 
changes . . . ultimately may have promoted liberty, there is no 
evidence that such was their purpose. Profit and the accumulation 
of wealth, not the attainment of liberty, were the highest 
aspirations of seventeenth-century Virginians and of the 
Englishmen who invested in Virginia. It was those aspirations and 
the need to facilitate the investment that would foster them which 
drove transformation of the colony’s law.55 
To be sure, no one would hold up seventeenth-century Virginia as a liberal 
society, particularly as African slavery became deeply entrenched in the 
economy and legal system of the colony in the second half of the century.56 
Nor am I claiming that markets alone are sufficient to push political 
institutions toward liberal outcomes. Nevertheless, as the rise of rule-of-law 
values in seventeenth-century Virginia shows, markets can be an important 
factor limiting the reach of the state and creating incentives for government 
officials to conform more closely to liberal ideals. 
 
 52. See 1 WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE COMMON LAW IN COLONIAL AMERICA: THE CHESAPEAKE 
AND NEW ENGLAND, 1607–1660, at 13–22 (2008) (discussing the legal regime of the early 
Jamestown settlement). 
 53. See id. at 23–47 (discussing the shift in the Virginia legal system after the revocation of 
the original Virginia Company charter in 1619). 
 54. See id. 
 55. Id. at 23. 
 56. See DAVID BRION DAVIS, INHUMAN BONDAGE: THE RISE AND FALL OF SLAVERY IN THE 
NEW WORLD 131–35 (2006) (discussing the introduction of African slavery to Virginia). 
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B. WEALTH 
Markets have proven the greatest engine for the creation of wealth in 
the history of the world. For most of human history, the material condition 
of mankind has not changed dramatically.57 While any attempt to measure 
such things is necessarily fraught with difficulty, our best estimates indicate 
that global GDP per person did not increase markedly from the time of the 
Roman Republic to the defeat of the Spanish Armada.58 In the seventeenth 
century, however, that began to change. Beginning in the Netherlands and 
spreading first to England and then later to North America, the rest of 
Europe, and finally portions of East Asia we began to see, for the first time, 
sustained and exponential growth.59 The rate of growth in and of itself was 
not dramatic—three to five percent per year—but adjusting out the peaks 
and troughs it continued year in and year out for the next three centuries. 
To give some sense of what this economic revolution meant, consider for a 
moment the fact that in the year 1800 the average daily consumption of a 
relatively prosperous American settler was roughly $3 per day in current 
value.60 After two-hundred years of sustained growth that same figure had 
multiplied some fifty times to roughly $150 per day for the average 
American.61 The difference between an income of $3 per day and $150 per 
day is the difference between the average citizen of Bangledesh and the 
average citizen of the United States.62 The movement of some societies from 
the first economic condition to the second economic condition is one of the 
great events in human history. 
 
 57. See MCCLOSKEY, supra note 16, at 2 (“Economic history has looked like an ice-hockey 
stick lying on the ground. It had a long, long horizontal handle at $3 a day extending through 
the two-hundred-thousand-year history of Homo sapiens to 1800, with little bumps upward on the 
handle in ancient Rome and the early medieval Arab world and high medieval Europe, with 
regressions to $3 afterward—then a wholly unexpected blade, leaping up in the last two out of 
the two thousand centuries, to $30 a day and in many places well beyond.”). 
 58. See id. 
 59. See JOYCE APPLEBY, THE RELENTLESS REVOLUTION: A HISTORY OF CAPITALISM 7 (2010) 
(“[Modern capitalism began] first in England and the Netherlands, next in Western Europe, 
and then in the American colonies. Outside these areas, capitalism moved next to Eastern 
Europe and Japan.”). 
 60. See MCCLOSKEY, supra note 16, at 1 (“In 1800 the average human consumed and 
expected her children and grandchildren and great-grandchildren to go on consuming a mere 
$3 a day, give or take a dollar or two.”). 
 61. Id. at 2 (“In the now much richer countries, such as Norway, the average person earns 
fully forty-five times more than in 1800, a startling $137 a day, or $120 for the average person 
in the United States, or $90 in Japan.”). 
 62. Id. at 1 (“Two centuries ago the world’s economy stood at the present level of 
Bangladesh.”). 
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There is a huge and controversial literature on why this shift took 
place.63 I don’t purport to have answers to the questions and debates these 
discussions pose, so I will confine myself to a few observations. First, 
sustained economic growth does not seem to have been the result of 
expropriating the wealth of others. For example, some have posited that the 
massive conquests of non-Western people that began after 1492 account for 
the economic rise of the West.64 The problem with this theory is that the 
timing and geography are wrong.65 Spanish conquistadors were ravaging the 
New World for centuries before the economic big bang began in the 
Netherlands, and often the actual economic consequences of their 
conquests were negative or a wash at best.66 For example, the massive 
importation of precious metals from the New World, far from permanently 
enriching the Spanish economy, led to widespread inflation in Europe and 
contributed to the ultimate fiscal collapse of the Spanish monarchy.67 We 
must reject the story of wealth-via-expropriation as, at best, incomplete.68 
Second, the economic explosion of the West cannot be explained in 
terms of traditional efficiency analysis. Indeed, there is a striking historical 
irony in the fact that as the intellectual foundations of equilibrium models 
of economics were being developed by the classical economists in the early 
nineteenth century, those same economists were remarkably pessimistic 
about the economic prospects for their society.69 Neither Malthus, Ricardo, 
 
 63. See NATHAN ROSENBERG & L.E. BIRDZELL, JR., HOW THE WEST GREW RICH: THE 
ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION OF THE INDUSTRIAL WORLD 9–19 (1986) (“The causes of the 
West’s rise from poverty to wealth have been extensively explored for a century-and-a-half.”). 
 64. Id. at 16 (“Several explanations turn on the relations between Western countries and 
other, economically less developed, countries. Marxists describe these relations as 
imperialism . . . .”). 
 65. Id. at 18 (“[T]he primary reason for doubting that an adequate explanation for 
Western growth is to be found in imperialism is the absence of any correlation between the 
magnitude and timing of Western countries’ economic growth and the magnitude and timing 
of their participation in imperialism.”). 
 66. See id. (“Imperialist Spain and Portugal did not achieve long-term growth . . . .”). 
 67. See APPLEBY, supra note 59, at 46 (“The flood of silver that the conquistadors stole 
from the Incas and Aztecs precipitated a century-long inflation in Europe.”). 
 68. See ROSENBERG & BIRDZELL, supra note 63, at 17–18 (“The eighteenth- and nineteenth-
century history of most imperialist countries makes their economic growth seem more a cause 
of imperialism, stimulating overseas political adventures in the irresponsible exercise of new-
found economic power, than its result.”). 
 69. Dierdre McCloskey makes the point, thus: 
The economists, in other words, did not notice that something entirely new was 
happening from 1760 or 1780 to 1860. As the demographer Anthony Wrigley put 
it a while ago, “The classical economists were not merely unconscious of changes 
going on about them that many now term an industrial revolution: they were in 
effect committed to a view of the nature of economic development that ruled it out 
as a possibility.” At the moment . . . that John Stuart Mill came to understand an 
economy in equilibrium, the economy grew away from the equilibrium. 
MCCLOSKEY, supra note 16, at 89 (footnote omitted). 
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nor Mill seem to have been aware of the revolutionary economic 
transformations through which they were living.70 They realized that 
increased efficiency in the allocation of the factors of production would 
result in only modest and marginal gains before settling into a static 
equilibrium.71 Yet, this is precisely what their societies were not doing. 
Instead, they were experiencing an explosion in economic growth far 
beyond anything predicted by the equilibrium models of the classical 
economists.72 
Third, the process of market exchange itself was a factor in the 
economic explosion of the West. One way of thinking about this is to look at 
the process of entrepreneurship.73 Widespread markets created incentives 
for people to experiment and innovate because they provided customers for 
new products and services.74 Entrepreneurs, in turn, created entirely new 
categories of goods and services in order to prosper in the market.75 It is not 
simply that they found ways of delivering existing goods and services with 
marginally greater efficiency. Rather, the process of entrepreneurship itself 
was a mechanism by which entirely new and better ways of living in the world 
were discovered.76 Thus, the telephone was not simply a more efficient 
version of the telegraph, which itself was far more than simply a marginally 
faster version of the letter. By providing a social space in which 
entrepreneurship thrived, the rise of widespread markets facilitated this 
discovery. Hence, while it is true that certain technological factors, such as 
the harnessing of cheap fossil fuel energy in coal and then oil, contributed 
to growth, markets were a key part of the social mechanism by which these 
technological improvements were discovered and implemented.77 
The value of wealth comes from two sources. The first is in the lessening 
of material suffering. By virtually any measure of human misery, wealthy 
 
 70. See id. at 87 (noting the scorn of Joseph Schumpeter for Malthus, Ricardo, and, in 
particular, Mill for failing to have any “idea of what the capitalist engine was going to achieve” 
(quoting JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, HISTORY OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 571 (Elizabeth B. 
Schumpeter ed., 1954))). 
 71. Id. at 92 (“To speak again to my economist colleagues, they [i.e., the classical 
economists] all contemplated moving down the marginal product of capital—not its shocking, 
factor-of-sixteen lurch to the right.”). 
 72. Id. at 86–87 (noting that nineteenth-century economists noted marginal increases in 
productivity and economic growth, but “did not notice, however, that the change to be 
explained, 1780–1860, was not 5 or 10 percent but 100 percent, and was on its way to that 
unprecedented 1,500 percent conservatively measured relative to what it was in the eighteenth 
century”). 
 73. See James M. Buchanan & Viktor J. Vanberg, The Market as a Creative Process, in THE 
PHILOSOPHY OF ECONOMICS: AN ANTHOLOGY 378, 378–98 (Daniel M. Hausman ed., 3d ed. 
2008). 
 74. See id. at 389–90. 
 75. See id. at 391. 
 76. See id. 
 77. See id. at 389. 
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societies are kinder to their inhabitants than impoverished societies.78 This is 
manifested in things such as lower infant mortality rates and greater leisure 
time.79 Wealth, however, also has other benefits. For example, societies with 
robust economic growth have lower levels of ethnic and religious conflict.80 
Likewise, they tend to have better treatment for women and minorities.81 
And so on. None of these things is logically related to wealth, let alone to 
markets. It is possible for poor people to be healthy. It is possible for poor 
societies to be peaceful and tolerant. Rather, my point is the more modest 
claim that wealthier societies are strongly correlated with a host of measures 
of well-being that should sway even those who are unimpressed by the crude 
piling up of personal fortunes.82 
C. VIRTUE 
Finally, markets can be justified as inculcators of certain personal 
virtues. Different activities are conducive to different virtues. Consider an 
extreme example: war. There is a long tradition of romanticizing warfare, a 
tradition that has led to more than its fair share of violence and human 
suffering. Nevertheless, conflict has a way of bringing out certain virtues, 
such as courage, self-sacrifice, fraternity, and self-discipline. The romantic 
portrayals of war are aesthetically powerful precisely because they appeal to 
these virtues. Much of the emotional appeal of war—and despite our 
appropriate horror of war, there is no denying it has had a very strong 
emotional appeal through the centuries—lies in the belief that it provides a 
forum in which these virtues are inculcated and demonstrated. While few 
poets have been tempted to write epics about the marketplace, the market, 
like war, inculcates its own set of virtues. 
 
 78. See BENJAMIN M. FRIEDMAN, THE MORAL CONSEQUENCES OF ECONOMIC GROWTH 12 
(2005) (“Greater affluence means, among many other things, better food, bigger houses, more 
travel, and improved medical care. It means that more people can afford a better education. It 
may also mean, as it did in most Western countries during the twentieth century, a shorter 
workweek, which allows more time for family and friends. Moreover, these material benefits of 
rising incomes accrue not just to individuals and their families but to communities and even 
entire countries. Greater affluence can also mean better schools, more parks and museums, and 
larger concert halls and sports arenas, not to mention more leisure to enjoy these public 
facilities. A rising average income allows a country to project its national interest abroad, or 
send a man to the moon.”). 
 79. Id. at 3 (noting that economic growth results in “greater life expectancy, fewer 
diseases, less infant mortality and malnutrition”). 
 80. Id. at 80 (“What matters is how rising incomes shape the perspective and attitudes of 
those who earn them, and their families, and how the resulting impact on enough individuals’ 
attitudes in turn brings about change in a country’s political institutions and social dynamics.”). 
 81. Id. at 79–80 (“It is not hard to see that a strong economy, where opportunities are 
plentiful and jobs go begging, helps break down social barriers. Bigoted employers may still 
dislike hiring members of one group or another, but when nobody else is available 
discrimination most often gives way to the sheer need to get the work done.”). 
 82. Id. at 12. 
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We can think of war as inculcating certain virtues because success in 
violent conflict requires a certain set of characteristics. A successful soldier 
must be brave and disciplined.83 It is the context in which the soldier’s 
actions occur that requires these virtues. Like war, market activity has a 
paradigmatic case, but rather than violent conflict, it is the process of 
exchange. Successful exchange requires that we constantly place our needs 
and desires in the context of another person’s needs and desires. In order to 
get what we want, we must in some way see to it that the other party gets 
what he wants. To be sure, this is not an altruistic concern, but it is a kind of 
concern for the other. 
Smith is perhaps the best candidate for a poet of the market. Although 
most often cast as the founding father of rational-choice economics, Smith 
spent his life as a moral philosopher.84 While he was not necessarily a virtue 
theorist, he was deeply influenced by classical thinkers who emphasized the 
importance of virtue and character and was tremendously concerned with 
moral sentiments—what we might think of as the emotional habits of moral 
life.85 He saw in commerce a system that tended to systematically punish 
predation against others and reward peaceful and diligent action.86 
In this, he mirrored many eighteenth-century theorists, such as 
Montesquieu, who lauded the effect of commerce upon manners. In Book 
Twenty of the Spirit of the Laws, Montesquieu provides an extended 
discussion of the moral impact of commerce on individuals and society. 
“Commerce,” he wrote, “cures destructive prejudices, and it is an almost 
general rule that everywhere there are gentle mores, there is commerce and 
that everywhere there is commerce, there are gentle mores.”87 In contrast to 
monarchial or aristocratic regimes, with their emphasis on honor, power, 
and conquest, commercial society tends to make men tolerant and peaceful. 
This is Montesquieu’s famous doux commerce argument. This does not mean, 
of course, that Montesquieu was indifferent to the moral dangers of 
commercial society, which he saw as very much a two-edged sword. 
“Commerce corrupts pure mores, and this was the subject of Plato’s 
complaints,” he wrote. “[I]t polishes and softens barbarous mores, as we see 
every day.”88 Likewise, he deplored the tendency of commercial society to 
reduce every human activity to monetary exchange: 
 
 83. See, e.g., PLATO, Laches, in THE COLLECTED DIALOGUES OF PLATO 123 (Edith Hamilton 
& Huntington Cairns eds., 1961) (c. 380 B.C.E) (discussing the nature of courage). 
 84. See NICHOLAS PHILLIPSON, ADAM SMITH: AN ENLIGHTENED LIFE 120–38, 159–79 
(2010) (discussing Adam Smith’s career as a moral philosopher). 
 85. See ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS (D.D. Raphael & A.L. Macfie 
eds., 1976) (1759); see also PHILLIPSON, supra note 84, at 138–58 (discussing “The Theory of 
Moral Sentiments and the Civilizing Powers of Commerce”). 
 86. See SMITH, supra note 1; SMITH, supra note 85. 
 87. MONTESQUIEU, supra note 41, at 338 (footnote omitted). 
 88. Id. (footnote omitted). 
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[I]f the spirit of commerce unites nations, it does not unite 
individuals in the same way. We see that in countries where one is 
affected only by the spirit of commerce, there is traffic in all human 
activities and all moral virtues; the smallest things, those required 
by humanity, are done or given for money.89 
For Montesquieu, commerce presented a threat to the highest ideals that 
one might imagine, but tended to have a beneficial effect on humanity as 
one actually encountered it. 
There is empirical evidence in support of Montesquieu’s thesis. 
Experimental studies show that market activity is strongly correlated with 
higher levels of interpersonal trust.90 Variations on the prisoner’s dilemma 
allow us to measure the strength of individual commitment to trust and 
reciprocity.91 For example, in the so-called ultimatum game there are two 
players. The experimenters give the first player a sum of money.92 That 
player then divides the money between himself and the second player.93 The 
second player then chooses whether to accept the division, in which case 
each player keeps the amount allocated by the first player.94 If the second 
player chooses to refuse the offer, then both players get nothing.95 A simple 
wealth-maximizing model of human behavior suggests that the first player 
should offer as little as possible to the second player, and the second player 
should accept.96 This result is almost never observed. The amount of money 
offered by the first player and the threshold below which the second player 
refuses, however, vary greatly from culture to culture.97 The simple formal 
structure of the game allows for cross-cultural comparisons, which reveal 
that there is an inverse relationship between suspicion and market 
penetration.98 The more important commerce is for a society, the higher the 
levels of observed trust and reciprocity in the ultimatum game.99 Societies 
with little market activity—such as those based on subsistence agriculture or 
 
 89. Id. at 338–39 (footnote omitted). 
 90. See Joseph Henrich et al., In Search of Homo Economicus: Behavioral Experiments in 15 
Small-Scale Societies, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 73, 73–78 (2001) (summarizing experiments with the 
ultimatum game carried out in several different cultural contexts); Joseph Henrich et al., 
“Economic Man” in Cross-Cultural Perspsective: Behavioral Experiments in 15 Small-Scale Societies, 28 
BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 795, 795–855 (2005) [hereinafter Henrich et al., “Economic Man”] 
(providing a more extensive discussion of the same experiments). 
 91. See Henrich et al., “Economic Man,” supra note 90, at 803. 
 92. See id. at 798. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. at 804. 
 98. See id. at 809. 
 99. See id. at 808. 
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animal husbandry—show the lowest levels of trust and reciprocity.100 Of 
course, it is difficult to tell which way causation flows from these results. 
Markets could be causing trust or trust could be causing markets to flourish. 
Regardless, we have good reasons to facilitate market transactions, either to 
jump start markets and thereby foster activity that will in turn foster trust, or 
alternatively, fostering markets may act as a multiplier for pre-existing trust, 
extending its reach and hold over peoples’ attitudes. 
IV. MARKETS AND CONTRACT LAW 
Contract law supports markets. This does not mean that markets and 
contract law are co-extensive. Markets may not be natural, but they do not 
require law in order to exist. Thriving informal and even illegal markets 
testify to this fact. Furthermore, throughout human history international 
trade has thrived even in circumstances in which it was difficult, if not 
impossible, to get the state to enforce one’s agreements. Contract law, 
however, can strengthen and deepen markets. By limiting opportunism, 
lowering transaction costs, inculcating moral attitudes conducive to market 
exchange, and the like, contract law makes widespread exchange between 
strangers easier and more likely. 
While contracts and markets are intimately intertwined, one of the 
striking features of most moral theories of contract law is their relative 
indifference to markets. The contemporary moral or philosophical literature 
on contract law is dominated by promissory theories of contract.101 Broadly 
speaking, all of these theories look at contracts as examples of promises and 
understand the basis of contractual obligation to be related in some 
fundamental way to the moral obligation to keep a promise.102 There is, of 
course, no necessary relationship between promissory morality and the 
market. We make promises all the time that have little or no relationship to 
commercial activity. Hence, one can develop an elaborate and complete 
theory of promising without saying much of anything at all about markets. 
Likewise, one can develop a promissory theory of contract law without saying 
much of anything about markets. This is largely what promissory theorists of 
contract have done. They have had much to say about the duty to keep a 
promise and the structure of contractual obligation.103 Their arguments, 
however, have been largely oblivious to the fact that—along with private 
property—contract is the central legal institution of a market economy. 
I don’t mean by this that promissory theorists are ignorant of the 
obvious fact that most contracts involve commercial activity or that they have 
ignored this fact in their theories. I do believe, however, that the 
 
 100. See id. at 810. 
 101. See SMITH, supra note 19, at 56. 
 102. See id. at 13, 57–58. 
 103. See generally SMITH, supra note 19. 
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relationship between contract law and markets has been taken as accidental, 
and that the value of markets—as opposed to promise keeping—has played 
little or no role in their arguments. In this section, I hope to show that this 
approach is a mistake and that focusing on the moral value of markets, as 
opposed to the moral value of promising, provides a better way of dealing 
with three basic problems with which any theory of contract law must deal. 
The first such question is why the law should concern itself with enforcing 
promises at all. Not all moral obligations are legally enforced. Why should 
promises be singled out for legal attention? The second is differentiating 
between those voluntary commitments that are legally enforced and those 
that are not. Even if promises should be legally enforced, not all promises 
are enforced. Why pick some promises for enforcement but not others? The 
third is the limited availability of specific performance, the remedy that 
would actually enforce contracts. If we believe that contract law should 
enforce promissory morality, then the wide availability of money damages 
seems perverse or, at best, a kind of second-best compromise. 
A. PROMISSORY THEORIES OF CONTRACT 
Section 1 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts states that “[a] 
contract is a promise or a set of promises for the breach of which the law 
gives a remedy, or the performance of which the law in some way recognizes 
as a duty.”104 While some scholars have expressed skepticism as to whether 
contracts are in fact promises, most judges, practitioners, and scholars 
accept that a contract consists of a legally enforceable promise.105 It does not 
follow from this, however, that most judges, practitioners, and scholars 
subscribe to a promissory theory of contract law. In other words, one may 
believe that contracts are made—in part—by making promises without 
thinking that the moral force of promising provides the normative 
justification for contract law. For example, law and economics scholars 
routinely refer to “promisors” and “promisees” in their work, even as they 
explicitly argue that economic efficiency justifies contract law.106 Likewise, 
partisans of reliance-based justifications for contract law, such as Grant 
Gilmore and Patrick Atiyah, speak of promises made and contracts formed, 
even though they do not normatively ground contract law in promissory 
morality.107 
Charles Fried offered the most unambiguous modern defense of a 
promissory theory of contract thirty years ago in his book Contract as 
 
 104. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 (1981). 
 105. See generally Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 269 
(1986); Michael G. Pratt, Contract: Not Promise, 35 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 801 (2008). 
 106. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 35, at 115–82 (8th ed. 2011) (summarizing economic 
theories of how contract law creates optimal economic incentives for promisors and promisees).  
 107. See P.S. ATIYAH, PROMISES, MORALS, AND LAW (1981); GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF 
CONTRACT (Ronald K.L. Collins ed., 1995). 
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Promise.108 For Fried, the relationship between contract and promise is 
simple and straightforward. When people make promises, they incur a moral 
obligation to keep those promises.109 When they fail to live up to these 
obligations and breach their promises, they treat others with disrespect.110 
Contract is simply the legal reflection of this moral structure. The legal 
obligations of contract correspond to the moral obligations to keep a 
promise, and the doctrinal structure of contract is simply the institutional 
instantiation of the moral structure of promise keeping.111 Since its 
publication a generation ago, Fried’s theory has attracted few disciples but 
has generated an enormous amount of discussion.112 Out of this discussion 
have come alternative formulations of the promissory approach to contract 
law. 
Consider the work of Seana Shiffrin.113 Unlike Fried, Shiffrin’s theory of 
contract is not reflective. She does not explicitly claim that contract law does 
or should reflect some underlying structure of promissory morality. Rather, 
she offers promissory morality as a kind of limiting principle on legitimate 
legal and political institutions. The law, she argues, should not encourage its 
citizens to behave in immoral ways, nor should it undermine a commitment 
to valuable moral practices.114 Shiffrin accepts that we have a moral 
obligation to keep our promises.115 She also believes that contract law 
invokes the practice of promising. As discussed in a moment, however, 
Shiffrin’s argument is primarily critical. She believes that contract law as it 
currently exists fails to comply with her theory of morality as a limiting 
principle. 
 
 108. See CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION 
(1981). 
 109. See id. at 13 (“In order that I be as free as possible, that my will have the greatest 
possible range consistent with the similar will of others, it is necessary that there be a way in 
which I may commit myself. It is necessary that I be able to make nonoptional a course of 
conduct that would otherwise be optional for me.”). 
 110. See id. at 16 (“To renege is to abuse a confidence he was free to invite or not, and 
which he intentionally did invite. To abuse that confidence now is like (but only like) lying: the 
abuse of a shared social institution that is intended to invoke the bonds of trust.”). 
 111. See id. at 1 (“The promise principle, which in this book I argue is the moral basis of 
contract law, is that principle by which persons may impose on themselves obligations where 
none existed before.”). 
 112. The thirtieth anniversary of the publication of Fried’s book was marked by a 
symposium on the work and its influence. The articles produced by the symposium provide a 
flavor for the sorts of discussions that have been sparked by Fried’s book. See generally 
Symposium, Contract as Promise at 30: The Future of Contract Theory, 45 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 601 
(2012). 
 113. See Seana Shiffrin, Could Breach of Contract Be Immoral?, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1551 (2009) 
[hereinafter Shiffrin, Immoral?]; Seana Valentine Shiffrin, The Divergence of Contract and Promise, 
120 HARV. L. REV. 708 (2007) [hereinafter Shiffrin, Divergence]. 
 114. See Shiffrin, Divergence, supra note 113, at 710. 
 115. See id. at 749. 
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B. WHY ENFORCE MORAL OBLIGATIONS? 
The first problem that confronts a promissory theory of contract is the 
question of why the law should seek to enforce moral obligations at all. This 
objection can take a strong form or a weak form. The strong form rests on 
the distinction within liberal philosophy between the right and the good. 
According to this view, liberal societies must begin with the brute fact of 
moral pluralism, the absence of widespread agreement about final goods 
and moral virtue. Accordingly, the law should remain neutral on such 
matters, allowing each citizen to decide for him or herself questions of 
personal morality and pursue his or her own vision of the good. The law 
should confine itself to protecting individual rights, a domain of justice that 
is conceptually independent of notions of the good. According to the strong 
objection, promissory morality is a matter of personal virtue and cannot be a 
legitimate legal concern.116 This does not mean, of course, that contract law 
is necessarily illegitimate, only that it cannot be legitimately defended as 
enforcing the moral obligation to keep a promise.117 
In its weaker form, this objection needn’t invoke a stark liberal divide 
between the right and the good. Rather than claiming that there is some 
clearly defined realm of moral demands—the good—that cannot 
legitimately be the subject of legal rules, one might simply acknowledge that 
not all moral obligations are legal obligations. This is true even in legal 
systems that have no liberal scruples about enforcing morality. For example, 
under classical Islamic law there is no sharp distinction between law and 
morality, or religion and the state, and there is certainly no objection to 
coercing moral behavior per se. “You are the best nation ever brought forth 
to men, bidding to honour, and forbidding dishonour, and believing in 
God.”118 Even so, Islamic legal theorists have a five-fold categorization of 
actions: those that are forbidden, those that are discouraged, those that are 
indifferent, those that are encouraged, and those that are required.119 
Hence, even in the view of the classical Sharia there are moral obligations 
that are not also coerced, legal obligations. So long as one does not believe 
that all moral obligations should become legal obligations—and I am 
unaware of any legal system that that has ever made such a claim—one must 
at least explain why promissory moral obligations should also be legal 
obligations. Merely demonstrating that there is a moral duty to keep a 
promise does not demonstrate that there should be a corresponding legal 
 
 116. See Randy E. Barnett, Some Problems with Contract as Promise, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1022, 
1025 (1992). 
 117. See id. at 1024. 
 118. 1 THE KORAN INTERPRETED 87 (A.J. Arberry trans., Touchstone 1996) (1955). 
 119. See, e.g., PETE SEDA, ISLAM IS . . . : AN INTRODUCTION TO ISLAM & ITS PRINCIPLES 45 
(2002) (providing a popular introduction to Islam). See generally Irshad Abdal-Haqq, Islamic 
Law: An Overview of Its Origin and Elements, 7 J. ISLAMIC L. & CULTURE 27 (2002) (providing a 
concise summary of Islamic law). 
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obligation, even if one does not subscribe to a sharp distinction between the 
right and the good. 
To be sure, some promissory theorists seek to answer this question. 
Fried’s response is to locate the obligation to keep a promise in the moral 
realm of the right rather than the good.120 His argument is that promise 
breaking is a breach of trust, an abuse of another person.121 It is not clear, 
however, that this claim stands up to closer scrutiny. First, there are other 
abuses of trust that are not legally prohibited, even though they are often 
more wrenching than a breach of contract. Consider, for example, the 
person who discovers that their significant other has been cheating. While 
such action might be a ground for divorce—and thus legal action—in the 
case of a married couple, among unmarried couples there may be no legal 
wrong at all. Second, not all broken promises involve a breach of a trust. 
Consider the habitual promise breaker whose commitments are never 
trusted. It would be odd to say that such a person breaches no moral 
obligation when, as expected, he breaks his promise. This suggests, however, 
that the wrong of promise breaking is not necessarily an abuse of trust. 
Shiffrin likewise seeks to answer this objection. Unlike Fried, her 
promissory theory of contract is not reflective.122 As a formal matter, she 
does not insist that the legal obligations of contract must correspond to the 
moral obligations of promise.123 However, in her hands, the side constraint 
of morality should have a considerable influence on the law of contracts. 
Because in her view the law cannot encourage its citizens to engage in 
immoral behavior or undermine moral practices, in practice, she argues that 
the law of contracts must mirror the morality of promising quite closely.124 
So long as the law of contracts enforces promises, it must do so in a way that 
coheres strongly with promissory morality.125 There is, however, something 
unsatisfying about this formulation, as it does not seek to explain why one 
would wish to have a law of contracts at all. 
If one accepts the social desirability of markets, then the question of 
why we enforce certain promises becomes much easier. On this view, 
contract law exists in large part to support markets. We enforce promises not 
because promissory morality is somehow uniquely deserving of legal 
enforcement. Rather, we legally enforce promises because doing so sustains 
 
 120. See supra note 109. 
 121. See id. at 16. 
 122. See Shiffrin, Immoral?, supra note 113, at 1557; Shiffrin, Divergence, supra note 113, at 
709. 
 123. See Shiffrin, Immoral?, supra note 113, at 1556; Shiffrin, Divergence, supra note 113, at 
709. 
 124. See Shiffrin, Immoral?, supra note 113, at 1568; Shiffrin, Divergence, supra note 113, at 
710–12. 
 125. See Shiffrin, Immoral?, supra note 113, at 1557; Shiffrin, Divergence, supra note 113, at 
717. 
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markets. Our goal is not the maintenance of promissory morality, but the 
maintenance of markets. Providing legal enforcement of promises does this 
in at least two ways. 
First, it deals with the problem of ex post opportunism. In a world of 
simultaneous exchange, quid is exchanged for pro and there is no need for 
the enforcement of contracts. When transactions are extended over time, 
however, there is always the danger that once A has conferred a benefit on B 
that B will renege and pocket the benefit.126 Thomas Hobbes summarized 
the problem: 
For he that performeth first, has no assurance the other will 
performe after; because the bonds of words are too weak to bridle 
mens ambition, avarice, anger, and other Passions, without the 
feare of some coërcive Power; which in the condition of meer 
Nature, where all men are equall, and judges of the justnesse of 
their own fears, cannot possibly be supposed.127 
As discussed below, Hobbes was too pessimistic about the possibility of 
exchange in the absence of law.128 On the other hand, by empowering 
disappointed promisees to take action against breaching promisors, the law 
of contract surely limits the amount of opportunism that we would otherwise 
expect to observe.129 More importantly, the availability of formal recourse in 
the event of breach gives market participants the confidence to engage in 
transactions that they would otherwise forgo out of fear of exploitation.130 
Second, the formal enforcement of promises helps to sustain the 
mutual trust between trading parties that makes formal enforcement itself of 
secondary importance. To understand what this means, consider an 
example from Herodotus. He tells of how Carthaginian traders first 
ventured out of the Mediterranean, beyond the Pillars of Hercules (the 
Straits of Gibraltar) and into the rougher seas of the Atlantic.131 Crawling 
down the coast of Africa, they came to a fertile land, and there engaged in a 
strange ritual.132 Going ashore, they would lay their cargo of olive oil and 
bronze tools on the beach.133 Then they would retreat to their ships, float off 
 
 126. See Nathan B. Oman, Consent to Retaliation: A Civil Recourse Theory of Contractual Liability, 
96 IOWA L. REV. 529, 546 (2011). 
 127. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 96 (Richard Tuck ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1991) 
(1651). 
 128. See Oman, supra note 126, at 545. 
 129. See id. at 551. 
 130. See id. at 560–63. 
 131. See HERODOTUS, THE HISTORIES bk. 4, ch. 42, at 318–19 (George Rawlinson trans., 
Everyman’s Library 1997) (c. 426 B.C.E.) (discussing the expedition of Phoenicians sent to 
circumnavigate Africa by the Egyptian King Neco). 
 132. See id. at bk. 4, ch. 196, at 381–82 (discussing trading practices by Carthaginians—a 
Phoenecian group—on the coasts of “Libya,” a region on the Atlantic coast of Africa). 
 133. See id. 
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shore, and send up smoke signals.134 A short time later, hoards of people 
would emerge from the forest, examine the goods left by the Carthaginians, 
and then lay their own piles of gold on the beach.135 Done, these people 
would then retreat back into the forest.136 Once they were gone, the 
Carthaginians would return to the shore.137 If they thought the offered ivory 
and gold constituted a fair trade, they would leave their goods and take the 
African commodities aboard their ship.138 If they thought the offer too low, 
they would return to their ships with nothing.139 The people would then 
emerge from the woods and either take back their gold without touching 
the Carthaginian goods or else would increase the size of their offering until 
it was accepted by the traders from the sea.140 The entire process, according 
to Herodotus, took place without either side speaking to the other or even 
knowing their language.141 
Herodotus’s story illustrates that the problem of ex post opportunism 
can be overcome in some circumstances even without the assistance of 
formal legal mechanisms.142 Humanity’s inclination to “truck and barter,” it 
would seem, wins out over its instincts for predation. This process, however, 
requires high levels of mutual trust, and we have numerous examples of 
societies where such trust is absent.143 Furthermore, to the extent that such 
mutual trust and forbearance among those of sharply differing viewpoints is 
one of the reasons we regard markets as desirable, then it would seem that 
we face a vicious circle. As Jules Coleman has observed: 
Under precisely those circumstances where markets are most 
desirable from the point of view of social stability, they are most 
difficult to create and sustain, whereas in those circumstances most 
conducive to low-cost market interaction, because of their 
impersonality, markets may well be less desirable forms of social 
organization.144 
 
 134. See id. 
 135. See id. 
 136. See id. 
 137. See id. 
 138. See id. 
 139. See id. 
 140. See id. 
 141. See id. 
 142. See id. at 382 (“Neither party deals unfairly by the other: for they themselves never 
touch the gold till it comes up to the worth of their goods, nor do the natives ever carry off the 
goods till the gold is taken away.”). 
 143. See ROBERT H. BATES, PROSPERITY AND VIOLENCE: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF 
DEVELOPMENT 43–45 (2001) (discussing the breakdown of trust and cooperation among the 
Neur tribes of East Africa). 
 144. COLEMAN, supra note 44, at 69. 
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According to Coleman, “the solution is to develop bodies of law that provide 
resources capable of reducing uncertainty and fostering market 
cooperation.”145 Contract does this, according to Coleman, by reducing the 
risk of ex post defection.146 As noted above, I have no quarrel with this claim, 
but I think it is incomplete. 
Law can also serve an important didactic function, indicating those 
actions that society regards as laudable and those that it regards as 
blameworthy. Such collective norm creation has an effect on behavior, as 
people seek to conform to collectively approved standards of behavior. Of 
course, the moral suasion of the law is hardly all-powerful or always justified. 
The mere fact that some legal sanction is attached to an action does not 
mean that people will refrain from doing the action, nor does the existence 
of a legal duty without more command universal respect. Nevertheless, our 
legal system depends on massive levels of voluntary compliance, compliance 
that is largely forthcoming from the public when the laws are regarded as 
legitimate. Hence, if we accept even a weak version of the law’s didactic 
power, then giving legal sanction to cooperative behavior via contract law 
will tend to foster norms of mutual performance. Put bluntly, people fail to 
renege on their agreements not simply because they fear formal legal 
sanctions, but because they wish to comply with the social norms of good 
behavior the law of contracts expresses. This law-fostered voluntary 
compliance, in turn, helps to underwrite the trust on which markets depend. 
It also provides an expressive reason for enforcing market promises. 
There is a variation on this argument based on the power of habit. 
Those things that we repeatedly do, regardless of our initial reasons, tend to 
become habitual. Of course, the fact that something is a habit does not 
mean that we always do it or cannot refrain from doing should we choose. 
That which is habitual, however, gets done with greater frequency than that 
which is not habitual. Through formal coercion and social suasion, the law 
of contracts encourages people to keep their commitments. As they 
repeatedly do so, however, commitment keeping becomes a habit. 
Furthermore, there is a self-reinforcing mechanism with habits. Habitual 
promise keepers are more likely to follow the dictates of the law of contracts, 
which reinforces its effectiveness and perceived legitimacy. The law of 
contracts, then, reinforces the habit of commitment keeping. 
C. NOT ALL PROMISES ARE ENFORCED AS CONTRACTS 
As the late E. Allan Farnsworth observed, “No legal system has ever been 
reckless enough to make all promises enforceable.”147 Any legal system will 
necessarily pick and choose among the promises that it will recognize as 
 
 145. Id. 
 146. See id. at 11920. 
 147. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 12 (2d ed. 1990). 
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legally binding contracts. This necessity, however, presents a problem for 
promissory theories. If the law is supposed to reflect moral obligations, why 
does it do so only incompletely? Why do we have some promises that are 
clearly morally binding but which are not recognized as legally binding 
contracts? 
Fried’s discussion of the doctrine of consideration illustrates the 
problem. In effect, Fried tries to solve this problem by declaring that it 
doesn’t exist.148 Rather than grapple with the truism articulated by 
Farnsworth, he argues that the doctrine of consideration does not actually 
exist. The cases, he insists, are too shot through with inconsistency and 
circular arguments to serve as a criterion for anything.149 In effect, he claims 
that the common law has no answer to the question of which promises the 
law should enforce.150 Fried offers this argument as a defense of his 
promissory theory, and it is easy to see why he would find such a position 
attractive. It makes it easier to claim that the law reflects the moral 
obligation to keep a promise. This, however, will not do. Fried is rather too 
hard on the doctrine of consideration. It is not clear that it is more prone to 
ambiguity and difficulty than the other doctrines that Fried defends. 
Furthermore, while it presents a number of difficult marginal cases—as does 
any doctrine—it offers a fairly straightforward claim: legally enforceable 
contracts consist of promises made in exchange for something.151 In the 
end, Fried’s hostility rests less on the internal problems of the consideration 
doctrine than on his commitment to justifying contractual liability purely on 
the basis of promissory morality. 
Shiffrin does not directly address the question of which promises the 
law should enforce. On the other hand, she is highly critical of the common 
law’s preference for money damages over specific performance.152 This rule, 
she argues, encourages people to treat their commitments as options, a view 
that she sees as incompatible with the moral obligation to keep a promise.153 
Elsewhere, she goes so far as to argue that the moral wrong involved in 
breaching a contract is so serious that it should give rise to a claim for 
 
 148. See FRIED, supra note 108, at 38 (“My conclusion is rather that the doctrine of 
consideration offers no coherent alternative basis for the force of contracts, while still treating 
promise as necessary to it.”).  
 149. See id. (“I conclude that the standard doctrine of consideration, which is illustrated by 
the preceding ten quite typical common law cases, does not pose a challenge to my conception 
of contract law as rooted in promise, for the simple reason that that doctrine is too internally 
inconsistent to offer an alternative at all.”). 
 150. See id. at 3738 (“I conclude that the life of contract is indeed promise, but this 
conclusion is not exactly a statement of positive law. There are too many gaps in the common 
law enforcement of promises to permit so bold a statement.”). 
 151. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71 (1981) (setting forth the bargain 
theory of consideration). 
 152. See Shiffrin, Divergence, supra note 113, at 723. 
 153. See id. at 731. 
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punitive damages on breach claims, damages that cannot be justified based 
on breach not being “morally wrong.”154 If the law’s refusal to enforce 
contracts with a decree of specific performance threatens to undermine the 
moral practice of promising by treating its obligations with insufficient 
respect, however, then picking and choosing among promises would also 
seem to be problematic. In effect, the law declares its indifference to the 
breach of the kinds of moral obligations that it has elsewhere declared to be 
worthy of legal recognition. Shiffrin’s theory is not reflective, so it doesn’t 
require that the law mirror moral obligations. It is, however, deeply 
concerned about the ability of the law to distort moral practices by using 
them in ways inconsistent with their underlying moral structure. Thus, 
without some justifying principle, it seems problematic for the law to enforce 
only some promises. 
If we focus our attention on markets rather than promissory morality, 
however, there is a ready answer to the challenge. On this view, contract law 
exists to facilitate markets rather than enforce moral obligations per se. 
Hence, when asking, “What promises should the law enforce?,” the answer 
is: “The law should enforce promises when doing so facilitates markets.” On 
the other hand, when the enforcement of a promise would merely vindicate 
one’s moral obligation to keep a commitment, unrelated to the market, we 
have less of a reason to enforce the promise. There is nothing about a 
market theory of contracts, of course, that precludes the law from 
recognizing promises unrelated to market activity. However, once one sees 
contract law as existing primarily to facilitate markets, these become 
marginal cases requiring special justification. 
This approach suggests that the law of contract formation should be 
structured so as to pick out those promises whose enforcement facilitates 
market activity. As a first-order approximation, this is what the bargain 
theory of consideration seeks to do. According to the Restatement (Second) 
of Contracts, “to constitute consideration, a performance or a return 
promise must be bargained for” and “a performance or return promise is 
bargained for if it is sought by the promisor in exchange for his promise and 
is given by the promisee in exchange for that promise.”155 In this doctrinal 
formulation, promises become legally enforceable contracts when there is 
consideration, and consideration requires that the promise is made in 
exchange for something else. In short, not all promises are enforced. 
Rather, only those promises that are part of an exchange are contracts. 
Exchange, of course, forms the basis for market transactions. Contract law, it 
would seem, is structured so as to pick out market transactions and, in effect, 
subsidize them by providing enforcement. Because they are not part of the 
 
 154. See Shiffrin, Immoral?, supra note 113, at 1551–52. 
 155. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71 (1981). 
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market, however, nonexchange promises are not treated as contracts 
precisely because the purpose of contract law is to sustain markets. 
It is useful to distinguish this defense of the doctrine of consideration 
from others that have been offered for it. Lon Fuller, for example, saw 
consideration as essentially a formal requirement, one that serves the 
functions of other formalities such as the seal requirement in the action of 
covenant.156 On this view, consideration serves evidentiary, cautionary, and 
channeling functions.157 The underlying assumption is that contract law 
should enforce commitments that are seriously entered into and provide a 
way of clearly delineating the scope of contractual promises.158 This is what 
the consideration doctrine does. Andrew Gold has offered a less pragmatic 
defense of the consideration doctrine.159 According to Gold, 
consideration—rather than serving the practical functions Fuller assigned to 
it—picks out obligations that are, as a matter of political morality, deserving 
of legal protection in and of themselves.160 According to Gold’s transfer 
theory, a contract creates a kind of property interest by the promisee in the 
promisor’s performance.161 This property interest arises because the 
exchange relationship marks out the Lockean conditions under which one 
may acquire a right to something other than one’s own person.162 
Whatever the merits of these theories, they are quite different than the 
market defense offered by this Article. My claim is not that bargained for 
promises should be enforced because their bargained for nature gives us 
assurance of their existence and the seriousness with which they were made. 
Nor am I claiming that the expectations of performance acquired in a 
bargained for promise are in themselves as a matter of substantive morality 
deserving of legal recognition in a way that expectations based on gratuitous 
promises are not. Rather, my claim is that bargained for promises are part of 
market transactions, and it is this fact that justifies their enforcement. We 
enforce them because doing so facilitates markets. Our law is uncomfortable 
enforcing wholly gratuitous promises because their enforcement has 
nothing to do with markets.163 
 
 156. See Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799, 799 (1941). 
 157. Id. at 799801. 
 158. See id. at 80001. 
 159. See Andrew S. Gold, A Property Theory of Contract, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1 (2009). 
 160. See id. at 44. 
 161. See id. at 5. 
 162. See id. at 5 & nn.17–18. 
 163. Hence the ambivalent attitude of the common law of contracts toward gratuitous gift 
promises. Compare Ricketts v. Scothorn, 77 N.W. 365 (Neb. 1898) (enforcing a gift promise 
under the doctrine of promissory estoppel), with Kirksey v. Kirksey, 8 Ala. 131 (1845) (refusing 
to enforce a gratuitous promise to convey a piece of land to a relative). See also Melvin Aron 
Eisenberg, The World of Contract and the World of Gift, 85 CALIF. L. REV. 821 (1997) (discussing 
the common law’s hostility to enforcing gift promises). 
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There are, of course, well-known objections to the doctrine of 
consideration, objections that can be couched in terms of the market 
arguments made here. For example, the doctrine of bargained for 
consideration creates difficulties in cases of contract modification.164 Hence, 
if midway through the performance of a contract the parties encounter an 
unanticipated problem, it is difficult to create a legally binding modification. 
The pre-existing duty rule will vitiate many modifications because they will 
not involve any new bargain.165 A market-focused view of contract would 
counsel in favor of allowing such modifications when doing so facilitates 
market transactions, even if there is no formal bargain. This is because the 
virtue of the bargain theory lies in the way in which it picks out market 
transactions, not in any inherent and exclusive value in bargains per se. Not 
all market transactions, however, are bargains for some new value. Hence, 
for example, the Uniform Commercial Code’s rule abolishing the 
consideration requirement for modification of sales contracts makes perfect 
sense.166 These are market transactions, and in the absence of fraud or other 
problems, modifications should be enforced even if there is no new bargain. 
D. CONTRACT LAW REMEDIES DON’T ALWAYS ENFORCE PROMISES 
The final problem is that, at least in the common law of contracts, the 
main remedy for breach of contract is not the enforcement of the promise. 
This claim is true in two senses. First, the law of contracts does not “enforce” 
contracts in the sense of requiring a breaching party to perform via an order 
of specific performance.167 Rather, the dominant remedy under the 
common law is the award of money damages.168 Second, the law of contracts 
does not “enforce” contracts in the sense of insuring that breaches of 
contract are sanctioned by the state.169 Rather, contract law is a species of 
private law, which means that rather than enforcing primary obligations it 
empowers wronged parties to act against those that have breached their 
obligations.170 If a potential plaintiff chooses not to sue, however, the law 
 
 164. See, e.g., Stilk v. Myrick, (1809) 170 Eng. Rep. 1168 (C.P.); Alaska Packers’ Ass’n v. 
Domenico, 117 F. 99 (9th Cir. 1902). 
 165. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 73 (1981) (“Performance of a legal duty 
owed to a promisor which is neither doubtful nor the subject of honest dispute is not 
consideration . . . .”); see also id. at illus. 4. 
 166. See U.C.C. § 2-209(1) (1990) (“An agreement modifying a contract within this Article 
needs no consideration to be binding.”). 
 167. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 359(1) (“Specific performance or an 
injunction will not be ordered if damages would be adequate to protect the expectation interest 
of the injured party.”). 
 168. See id. § 346(1) (“The injured party has a right to damages . . . .”). 
 169. See Oman, supra note 126, at 532–34 
 170. See Nathan B. Oman, Why There Is No Duty To Pay Damages: Powers, Duties, and Private 
Law, 39 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 137 (2011). 
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does nothing to “enforce” the promissory obligation inherent in the 
contract.171 
Fried has claimed that the link between what he calls the promise 
principle and expectation damages is “palpable.”172 The appeal to the self-
evidence of money damages, however, falls flat for a number of reasons.173 
First, in some circumstances, the common law will award specific 
performance rather than money damages, and in most civil law countries, 
specific performance is the default remedy. Why isn’t this remedy’s 
connection with the promise principle more “palpable”? Second, it is 
unclear why the moral obligation to keep a promise requires remedies in the 
event of breach. Why not punish promise breakers in the same way that we 
punish thieves? It is unclear why the moral obligation to keep a promise 
commits us to some remedial scheme rather than punishment or some 
other response. 
Other promissory theorists have struggled with the issue of remedies. 
Shiffrin has been the harshest recent critic of money damages for breach of 
contract.174 She takes particular aim at the theory of efficient breach, which 
sees contract law as a licensing breach so long as the breaching party is 
willing to pay damages.175 Such an approach is unacceptable, she argues, for 
at least two reasons. First, it encourages citizens to behave in morally 
reprehensible ways, breaking their promises without a good excuse.176 
Second, by encouraging such flouting of promissory obligations, it 
undermines the practice of promising itself.177 Accordingly, Shiffrin argues 
that the law should switch the default remedy to specific performance or, 
perhaps, should sanction deliberate breach of contract with punitive 
damages.178 
To be sure, there have been sophisticated attempts to reconcile the 
award of money damages with promissory theories of contract. One 
possibility is that all contracts happen to be disjunctive promises to either 
perform or pay damages.179 This is the approach suggested by some 
economic theorists, who insist that in a fully specified contract this is 
precisely what the parties would have explicitly agreed to.180 Fried has 
 
 171. See Oman, supra note 126, at 560. 
 172. See FRIED, supra note 108, at 21. 
 173. For a fuller critique of Fried’s arguments on this point, see Nathan B. Oman, Promise 
and Private Law, 45 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 935 (2012). 
 174. See Shiffrin, Divergence, supra note 113, at 722–24. 
 175. See id. at 730. 
 176. See id. at 731–32. 
 177. See id. at 732–33. 
 178. See id. at 734; see also Shiffrin, Immoral?, supra note 113, at 1551–52. 
 179. See Steven Shavell, Essay, Is Breach of Contract Immoral?, 56 EMORY L.J. 439, 457 (2006). 
 180. See id. 
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recently indicated that he holds to something like this view.181 This 
argument faces two problems. First, it rests on a contingent and debatable 
claim about the content of contractual promises.182 Second, it is inconsistent 
with the pleading requirements and doctrinal structure of the common law 
of contracts, which does not acknowledge the payment of damages as a 
substitute for performance.183 Instead, damages, rather than forming part of 
the obligations of a contract, are conceptualized as a remedy in the face of 
the breach of those obligations. Jody Kraus has accepted this point and 
argued that it is possible to specify—as a matter of promissory morality—not 
only one’s obligations under a promise but also one’s remedial obligations 
in the event of the failure to keep those obligations.184 This, however, 
remains a highly controversial claim about the nature of promissory 
morality. It is certainly plausible to suppose that while promissory morality 
gives agents control over the content of their primary moral obligations 
flowing from a promise, it does not give agents power over the moral 
consequences of their own immoral behavior in breaking a promise. 
The persistence of money damages presents a theoretical difficulty 
because the assumption of promissory theories is that contract law exists to 
vindicate promissory obligations. On the other hand, if we see contract law 
as existing to facilitate markets, then this difficulty disappears. Even if we 
accept the Restatement’s formulation of contracts as “a promise or a set of 
promises for the breach of which the law gives a remedy, or the performance 
of which the law in some way recognizes as a duty,”185 it doesn’t follow that 
contract law is joined at the hip to promissory morality. Rather, contact law 
invokes promising not for its own sake but because by attending to promises 
it can facilitate markets. On this view, promises are instrumentally, rather 
than inherently, valuable. They are recognized and enforced only in so far as 
that recognition and enforcement facilitates markets. 
While markets are not natural, they do not depend on law for their 
existence. Thriving markets in illegal commodities such as drugs, sex, and 
pirated Hello Kitty bags demonstrate this fact. Contract law and other 
market-sustaining legal regimes do not create markets. Rather, they 
strengthen pre-existing practices. While courts often speak of enforcing a 
contract, more commonly they are concerned with a slightly different 
concept, namely liability. The term itself is suggestive. Liability refers to 
 
 181. Charles Fried seemed to adopt this position during his remarks at a recent Suffolk 
University Law School conference on the thirtieth anniversary of the publication of Contract as 
Promise. Charles Fried, Contract as Promise at 30: Closing Remarks (Mar. 25, 2011) (downloaded 
using iTunes). 
 182. See Shiffrin, Immoral?, supra note 113, at 1557. 
 183. See generally Oman, supra note 170. 
 184. See Jody S. Kraus, The Correspondence of Contract and Promise, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1603, 
1627–34 (2009). 
 185. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 (1981). 
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vulnerability rather than coercion or obligation per se. To be liable is to be 
exposed to attack from others. Hobbes famously suggested that in the state 
of nature life was “nasty, brutish, and short.”186 Anarchic systems, however, 
are shot through with mechanisms for maintaining order and cooperation 
in the absence of the state.187 The idea of liability is key to understanding 
these practices. 
According to Hobbes, the problem with the state of nature is its 
ubiquitous vulnerability. “Hereby it is manifest, that during the time men 
live without a common Power to keep them all in awe, they are in that 
condition which is called Warre; and such a warre, as is of every man, against 
every man.”188 Unprotected from predation by others, “there is no place for 
Industry; because the fruit thereof is uncertain . . . and . . . worst of all, 
continuall feare, and danger of violent death; And the life of man, solitary, 
poore, nasty, brutish, and short.”189 The solution to this problem, according 
to Hobbes, is Leviathan, an omnipotent state that can suppress all private 
predation and guarantee security to all. And therein lies the problem.190 
Vulnerability has a way of making people cautious toward others. 
People who are open to attack tend not to be predatory.191 It is only when 
one becomes relatively invulnerable that predation becomes an optimal 
strategy. Consider the recurrent pattern in human history of mobile, horse-
mounted raiders attacking relatively immobile agriculturalists.192 The 
predators in this scenario are predators precisely because they can easily run 
away when attacked and are thus less vulnerable than their victims. The Cold 
War debate over anti-ballistic missile systems hinged on the same issue.193 
The fear was that a country that was invulnerable to nuclear attack was far 
more likely to become a nuclear aggressor.194 
In contrast, consider the practice of giving a hostage as part of a treaty. 
The purpose of exchanging hostages was to make the parties to the treaty 
permanently vulnerable to one another.195 It was this very vulnerability that 
 
 186. HOBBES, supra note 127, at 89. 
 187. See Oman, supra note 126, at 545. 
 188. HOBBES, supra note 127, at 88. 
 189. Id. at 89. 
 190. See Oman, supra note 126, at 544–51 (arguing that cooperation can be undermined by 
systems and situations that render contracting parties invulnerable to one another). 
 191. See id. at 533. 
 192. See id. at 547. 
 193. See JOHN LEWIS GADDIS, THE COLD WAR: A NEW HISTORY 81 (2005) (discussing the 
debates over ballistic-missile defense). 
 194. See id. (noting that the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty “was the first formal 
acknowledgment, by both sides, of Churchill’s—and Eisenhower’s—idea that the vulnerability 
that came with the prospect of instant annihilation could become the basis for a stable, long-
term, Soviet-American relationship”). 
 195. See Oman, supra note 126, at 548. 
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acted as the spur to good behavior.196 Modern game theory provides a 
similar insight.197 When the prisoner’s dilemma is played as a one-shot game, 
the optimal strategy is to defect, in part because the players in the game have 
no way of sanctioning those that defect.198 On the other hand, if the game is 
played in successive rounds, the parties become vulnerable to one 
another.199 If you defect in this round, then I can punish you in the next 
round by defecting. A strategy of cooperation coupled with tit-for-tat 
retaliation emerges.200 The vulnerability of the parties fosters cooperation 
and trust.201 
Contractual liability fosters cooperation by making promisors 
vulnerable within a framework that otherwise protects them from predation. 
It balances the conflicting needs of being secure from attack and avoiding 
the invulnerability that can undermine cooperation. The central moral 
obligation associated with promising is the obligation to do what one has 
promised. The most natural legal analog to this moral obligation is the 
principle of pacta sunt servada. This is not, however, what the law of contracts 
does. Rather, it provides disappointed promisees with a way of retaliating 
against those that break their promises. Contract law makes people 
vulnerable, liable. It allows tit-for-tat and, in effect, makes the promisor’s 
non-exempt assets a hostage to his performance. Rather than coercing the 
performance of a moral obligation to keep one’s promises, contract law is 
oriented toward reaping the benefits of the state of nature—the way its 
ubiquitous vulnerability makes sanctioning those that renege on their 
agreements easy—while avoiding the very pathologies which that 
vulnerability creates. The result is a legal institution that extends the reach 
of the pre-legal dynamics that make markets possible. 
V. CRITICISMS AND LIMITATIONS 
Thus far, the structure of this Article’s argument has necessarily led me 
to take a celebratory stance towards markets. I believe that such a stance is 
justified. In broad historical terms, markets have been an enormously 
beneficent influence on human societies. Commerce, on balance, makes our 
polities more peaceful, stable, and humane. Its practice tends to make us 
into better people. That said, however, it would be the rankest kind of 
Panglossianism to assume that markets are always positive in either their 
outcomes or their operation. Accordingly, in this section we turn to some of 
the central criticisms that can be leveled at markets. The first is that markets 
 
 196. See id. 
 197. See id. at 549. 
 198. See id. 
 199. See id. 
 200. See id. 
 201. See id. 
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result in distributive outcomes that cannot be normatively justified. The 
second is that markets are heterogeneous and can sometimes turn 
pathological. While I do not believe that either of these objections justifies 
rejecting the ultimately positive assessment of markets I have offered thus 
far, there is some merit to both of them. 
I do not, however, believe that these objections are fatal to the central 
thesis of this Article, namely that contract law is best thought of as existing to 
support markets because markets are themselves normatively desirable. Even 
if one qualifies one’s support of markets by acknowledging their normative 
limitations, they can continue to justify contract law so long as we 
acknowledge that contract law must be limited so as not to support markets 
in their pathological inflection. 
A. DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE 
Aristotle claimed that distributive justice represents a geometric 
principle.202 On first reading, the reference to mathematics seems out of 
place, but the philosopher was making an important point about the 
structure of justice. In claiming that distributive justice is geometric, he was 
not offering a substantive theory of justice. Rather, he was making a claim 
about what is at issue in the concept of distributive justice. At its heart, 
Aristotle insisted, justice is about a ratio, the ratio between an individual’s 
possession of some morally relevant characteristic and that individual’s share 
of the desirable things of life.203 A distribution is just when this ratio is the 
same for all of the morally relevant members of a society.204 For example, 
suppose that one subscribes to a racist theory of distributive justice, whereby 
the desirable things of life should be granted in equal shares to those of the 
favored race and denied to those of all other races. Now as a substantive 
matter, such a theory of justice is false and evil. It is nevertheless identifiable 
as a distributive theory. The proper ratio between the theory-relevant 
characteristic—race—and the good things of life is maintained for each 
individual. 
Markets distribute desirable social goods. Indeed, this is one of their 
primary functions. A well-worn criticism of markets states that they do so in 
distributively unjust ways. Stated in Aristotelian terms, there is no plausible 
moral characteristic such that the ratio between that characteristic and the 
distribution of the desirable things of life effected by the market holds true 
for all members of society. To put some flesh on this abstraction, consider 
the case of Carlos Slim Helu, the head of Telmex, the Mexican telecom 
 
 202. See ARISTOTLE, NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS 95–96 (F.H. Peters trans., Barnes & Noble 
2004) (c. 384 B.C.E.) (“We see then that which is just is in some sort proportionate.”). 
 203. See id. (“That which is just, then, requires that there be four terms at least, and that the 
ratio between the terms and the same.”). 
 204. See id. 
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giant, who was, according to Forbes, the richest person on the planet in 2012, 
with a net worth of $69 billion.205 Helu’s yearly income is roughly $18.5 
billion, while the median per capita income in Mexico is roughly $14,800 
per year.206 In other words, Helu’s income is over 1,250,000 times greater 
than that of his average countryman. It would be very difficult, however, to 
imagine any morally relevant characteristic that a person possesses in such 
vast quantities relative to others. When markets create such disparities—and 
admittedly in Helu’s case his wealth was amassed thanks to significant 
intervention by the Mexican state—then they are distributionally unjust. 
The distributive attack on markets, however, generally goes beyond 
mere skepticism about the possibility of a theory of justice defending market 
distributions. Rather, the critique almost always comes from egalitarians who 
believe that, at least as a first approximation, the desirable things of life 
should be distributed equally to all. Of course, sophisticated egalitarians do 
not advocate anything approaching absolute equality, but they do tend to 
believe that deviations from an equal distribution are suspect and require 
special justification. John Rawls, for example, argued that some of the 
inequities of a market system may be justified because they are necessary to 
incentivize the creation of wealth, but such inequities can be maintained 
only so long as they benefit the least well-off members of society.207 
Understood in these terms, the market is presumptively unjust, which would 
suggest that standing alone it cannot operate as a moral justification. 
There are essentially two ways that this line of argument can be met. 
The first approach is to offer a libertarian defense of markets. On this view, 
markets are in fact distributionally just, or at least presumptively so. Robert 
Nozick offered the most famous modern version of this argument.208 
Rejecting what he called “patterned” theories of distributive justice, Nozick 
argued that one cannot judge any distribution as just by simply observing its 
correspondence with some ideal. Rather, he argued that any distribution is 
potentially just as long as it is the result of a series of past transactions that 
are voluntary.209 Put in Aristotelian terms, the morally relevant category to 
which distributions are to be related is a particular sort of historical 
 
 205. See The World’s Billionaires: Carlos Slim Helu & Family, FORBES, http://www.forbes.com/ 
profile/carlos-slim-helu/ (last visited Sept. 18, 2012). 
 206. See Moguls: Carlos Slim Helu Is World’s Richest Man, DAILY BEAST (Mar. 10, 2010, 2:28 PM), 
http://www.thedailybeast.com/cheats/2010/03/10/carlo-slim-helu-is-worlds-richest-man.html; 
The World Fact Book: Mexico, CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, https://www.cia.gov/library/ 
publications/the-world-factbook/geos/mx.html (last updated Sept. 10, 2012). This number 
represents per capita GDP, which is simply GDP divided by population. Because many members 
of the population are not wage earners—such as children, women working in the home, etc.—
average income for wage earners is probably somewhat higher. None of this, however, is 
relevant to the argument in the text. 
 207. See RAWLS, supra note 43. 
 208. See ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 155–60 (1974). 
 209. See id. at 155–56. 
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pedigree. Hence, in evaluating the justice of Helu’s wealth relative to that of 
his countrymen, what should arouse moral concern is not the size of Helu’s 
holdings but the means by which he acquired them.210 Provided that the 
markets in question conform to Nozick’s conditions of voluntary alienation 
of entitlements and respect for individual rights, then the distributions they 
produce are by definition just.211 
There is also an older, libertarian defense of the justice of market 
distribution based on the idea of desert. For example, John Bates Clark, an 
American economist writing at the end of the nineteenth century, argued 
that in a competitive market all economic inputs—labor, land, and capital—
would be paid according to their marginal productivity.212 The resulting 
distributions were just because each person received an amount equal to his 
contribution. “To every man his product, his whole product and nothing but 
his product,” Clark explained.213 
One needn’t accept these libertarian arguments, however, in order to 
defend markets from the distributional attack. This is fortunate because 
whatever their merits in the abstract, both arguments place very demanding 
conditions on markets, conditions that in all likelihood cannot be met in the 
real world. Setting aside the very difficult question of voluntariness, given 
the historical and contemporary ubiquity of various forms of expropriation, 
it is unlikely that the exacting historical conditions necessary for Nozick’s 
theory can be met.214 Likewise, even if Clark’s economic analysis is correct 
and perfectly competitive markets give to each person the marginal value of 
their productive contributions, it is still true—as I argued above—that the 
conditions for perfectly competitive markets are seldom, if ever, realized in 
the real world. 
Other defenses of markets, however, are available. Consider the second 
theorem of welfare economics. As noted above, the first theorem states that 
the final distribution of goods and services in a competitive market will be 
 
 210. See id. at 28–29. 
 211. See id. at 29. 
 212. See BARBARA H. FRIED, THE PROGRESSIVE ASSAULT ON LAISSEZ FAIRE: ROBERT HALE AND 
THE FIRST LAW AND ECONOMICS MOVEMENT 1–2 (1998) (describing Clark’s economic and 
moral theories). Clark defended his claims most fully in JOHN BATES CLARK, THE DISTRIBUTION 
OF WEALTH (Augustus M. Kelley rprt. 1965) (1899). 
 213. See FRIED, supra note 212, at 2 (quoting John Bates Clark, The Law of Wages and Interest, 
1 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 43, 44 (1890)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 214. The issue of what counts as a voluntary transfer is conceptually difficult. As critics of 
laissez faire have long argued, the seemingly voluntary transactions of the market can be 
characterized as coercive. See id. at 29–70 (discussing “The Empty Idea of Liberty”). To his 
credit, Robert Nozick has offered one of the most sophisticated modern expositions of the 
problems associated with the idea of voluntariness, as well as his own theory of what counts as a 
voluntary transaction. See generally ROBERT NOZICK, SOCRATIC PUZZLES 15–44 (1997) 
(containing Nozick’s “study of coercion”). 
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Pareto-optimal and will result from a series of Pareto-superior moves.215 The 
second theorem is a corollary to it, namely that any final, Pareto-optimal 
distribution can be achieved in an efficient market by manipulating the 
initial distribution of goods and services.216 It seems plausible to suppose 
that any reasonable theory of distributive justice will defend a Pareto-optimal 
distribution. This does not mean, of course, that Pareto optimality is itself a 
theory of distributive justice. Many distributionally unjust outcomes could be 
Pareto-optimal. I only mean to suggest that Pareto optimality is a necessary, 
but not a sufficient, condition for a fair distribution. This is, of course, a very 
weak constraint on distributional theories. It means only that we cannot 
regard a change in distribution that leaves at least one person better off 
while leaving no one worse off as an injustice.217 If this is correct, then the 
second theorem suggests that in an efficient market any reasonably just 
distribution may be achieved, so long as the initial entitlements are properly 
adjusted ex ante. 
Of course this ex ante argument requires that we have perfectly efficient 
markets, or alternatively, markets that are sufficiently efficient to result in 
Pareto-optimal distributions. This condition may not be met. It is, however, 
possible to make distributional adjustments ex post to market results in 
order to reach desired outcomes. This is a variation of an argument that is 
habitually made by efficiency proponents of the market. They argue, in 
effect, that markets should be ordered so as to maximize joint profit, even if 
one believes that the resulting distribution will be perverse as a matter of 
justice. This is because it is always possible after the fact to redistribute 
wealth via taxes and transfer payments. 
In the real world, the distinction between ex ante and ex post 
manipulation of entitlements breaks down. This is because social outcomes 
are never determined in a neat three-step process of (1) ex ante 
distribution; (2) market activity; and (3) ex post redistribution. Rather, 
market processes and their alternatives are continuous. In effect, step 2 is 
constant, and any action at step 1 could be recharacterized as a step 3 action 
and vice versa. Consider state-provided public education. The education 
could be thought of as altering the initial ex ante distribution of each actor, 
in effect giving each adult additional resources at the starting line of 
economic life. Alternatively, public education can be seen as a transfer of 
 
 215. See JOHN LEACH, A COURSE IN PUBLIC ECONOMICS 35 (2004) (setting forth the first 
theorem of welfare economics). 
 216. See id. (“Second theorem: Each Pareto optimal allocation is the competitive allocation 
under some distribution of the endowed goods.”). 
 217. Strictly speaking, this may be an even weaker condition than it appears. To be Pareto-
superior, a new distribution would need to not only not leave any person worse off in material 
terms (i.e., poorer) but also not be disapproved by any one for any other reason. See generally 
AMARTYA SEN, The Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal, in CHOICE, WELFARE AND MEASUREMENT 285, 
285–90 (1982). 
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income from wealthy households in the form of taxes to poorer households 
in the form of a free service, in effect an ex post redistribution. This 
fuzziness needn’t concern us much if our goal is some just distribution 
different than the one that the market would otherwise produce. Instead, it 
is enough to say that markets needn’t be distributionally perverse—even to 
those that reject the libertarian argument for the inherent justness of 
market distributions—so long as they are accompanied by various other 
forms of distribution that ameliorate their effects. 
The question that remains is what impact, if any, the distributive justice 
critique of markets should have on the central thesis of this Article. My 
answer is: very little. If one subscribes to the libertarian defenses sketched 
above, then the distributive outcomes of markets are per se just. My thesis, 
however, does not require the defense of such a strong claim. While I do 
celebrate the virtues of markets, I am not defending capitalist anarchy in this 
Article. My claim is not that markets provide the sole legitimate means of 
social or political organization or that they provide a justification for all of 
our legal and political institutions. Rather, my claim is that markets provide 
the best justification for contract law. This is admittedly an important legal 
institution, but it is ultimately one among many. Hence, for my thesis to 
survive the distributional critique of markets, all that is necessary is to show 
that markets are consistent with most reasonable theories of distributive 
justice. For the reasons sketched above, I believe this is a burden that can be 
easily met. 
B. HETEROGENEITY AND THE PROBLEM OF PATHOLOGICAL MARKETS 
Not all markets are the same. One of the effects of modern economics, 
especially neo-classical price theory, is to homogenize our view of markets.218 
In place of the heterogeneity of actual markets, economics tends to flatten 
out the differences between different kinds of markets.219 In place of the 
manifest differences between, for example, international securities markets, 
the market for locally grown produce, and the market for professional labor, 
economics presents iterations on the central theme of prices moving along 
supply and demand curves toward an efficient market-clearing price.220 
Classical economists from Adam Smith to Karl Marx, however, tended 
to emphasize the heterogeneity of markets. Smith famously described the 
benefits of specialization and the division of labor using the example of a 
pin factory.221 He also worried, however, about the effects of the change 
from a labor market dominated by individual craftsmen to a market 
 
 218. See DEBRA SATZ, WHY SOME THINGS SHOULD NOT BE FOR SALE: THE MORAL LIMITS OF 
MARKETS 44–49 (2010) (discussing “Heterogeneous Markets”). 
 219. See id. 
 220. See id. at 17–21 (discussing market efficiency). 
 221. See id. at 44–45 (discussing Adam Smith’s analysis of the effects of specialization on 
laborers). 
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dominated by factory workers performing simple and repetitive tasks.222 
Smith’s concern was that working lives devoid of the complex tasks faced by 
craftsmen would tend to deaden the intellectual facilities of workers, 
rendering them unable to meet the demands of citizenship.223 It was a 
theme that Marx picked up on in his famous thesis about the alienation of 
the worker from the product of his labor and its baleful effects on human 
happiness.224 The simplifying and homogenizing approach of modern 
economics has yielded considerable analytical insights. Modern price theory 
provides a much better model of how value is created in transactions, the 
price at which contracts are made, and the way that price distributes value 
than do, for example, the clumsy labor theories of value that Smith and 
Marx employed. The earlier theories, however, draw attention to the way in 
which markets can turn pathological, representing an inversion of 
Montesquieu’s doux commerce thesis. 
Markets can turn pathological in at least two ways. First, markets may be 
structured around the production and distribution of goods and services 
that are in some way evil. Consider, for example, a market in child sex. For a 
variety of reasons, we should regard child prostitution as evil. The necessarily 
dependent status of children renders child prostitution markets even more 
prone to violence and abuse than adult prostitution markets. Child 
prostitution sexualizes children long before they have the emotional 
capacity to deal with sexuality. Other examples of markets in evil goods or 
services abound. 
A variation on this objection notes that there are certain things that, 
while not inherently evil, become undesirable when traded in a market. Sex 
is the quintessential example. While some have no per se objection to 
prostitution so long as it is fully voluntary and unaccompanied by abuse, 
most people believe that there is something inherently wrong about trading 
sex for money and money for sex. This belief, however, needn’t imply that 
sex engaged in outside of the context of a market transaction is wrong. 
Margaret Radin has argued that the law should adopt a market inalienability 
rule, refusing to enforce contracts involving the purchase or sale of goods or 
services that implicate core matters of identity.225 In other cases, we might 
worry that market transactions will crowd out alternative and desirable 
 
 222. See id. 
 223. See id. 
 224. See Karl Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, in THE MARX-ENGELS 
READER 66, 96 (Robert C. Tucker ed., 2d ed. 1978) (discussing the idea of a worker’s alienation 
from the product of his labor). 
 225. See Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849 (1987) (setting 
forth the argument that certain entitlements should not be alienated within a market); cf. In re 
Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988), superseded by statute, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 9:3-46 (West 2002), as 
recognized in In re Adoption of Children by G.P.B., 736 A.2d 1277 (N.J. 1999) (refusing to 
enforce a surrogacy contract). 
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means of enforcement.226 Similarly, for example, some have claimed that 
paying for blood actually reduces the supply of blood donations because it 
crowds out voluntary donations.227 
The second way that a market might be evil is if the process of exchange 
in the market degrades its participants in some way, even if the good or 
service traded in the market is not itself evil. Sometimes the response may be 
frankly paternalistic. In Lochner v. New York, the state placed restrictions on 
the working hours of bakers not because markets in bread were purveying 
an evil commodity, but because either disparities in bargaining power or an 
inability to perceive their true interests led bakers to work longer hours than 
the state determined to be safe.228 Alternatively, one might object to the way 
a market alters or reinforces certain social structures. For example, one 
might object to a market in indentured servitude because it would tend to 
lead to a stratified and status-bound society of servants and masters.229 
My object here is not to evaluate the merits of any of the specific 
arguments as to why a market is pathological. Rather, let us assume—as 
seems to me eminently reasonable—that the set of such pathological 
markets is not empty but also does not include all markets. What then 
follows for the core claim of this Article that contract law is justified by the 
moral desirability of markets? The answer is that it must be qualified. Not all 
markets are morally desirable. There are healthy markets and pathological 
markets. Contract law, however, is not institutionally well suited to suppress 
pathological markets. This is a task better performed—if it is to be 
performed at all—by criminal law or regulatory authorities. However, if 
contract law’s justification rests in the desirability of markets, then there is 
no justification under this theory for enforcing the contracts supporting 
pathological markets. Doctrinally, this basic intuition is reflected in the rule 
that contracts may be void as violating public policy. Thus, for example, 
 
 226. See Ronald J. Gilson, Charles F. Sabel & Robert E. Scott, Braiding: The Interaction of 
Formal and Informal Contracting in Theory, Practice, and Doctrine, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1377 (2010) 
(arguing that formal contract enforcement may crowd out informal mechanisms of 
organization). 
 227. See RICHARD M. TITMUSS, THE GIFT RELATIONSHIP: FROM HUMAN BLOOD TO SOCIAL 
POLICY (1971) (arguing that payments for blood donation undermine the propensity to 
donate). 
 228. See Lockner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 58–63 (1905), overruled in part by Ferguson v. 
Skrupa, 372 U.S. 728 (1963) (discussing the state’s interest in restricting the working hours for 
New York bakers). 
 229. See Nathan B. Oman, Specific Performance and the Thirteenth Amendment, 93 MINN. L. REV. 
2020 (2009) (arguing that the Thirteenth Amendment prohibits employers from dominating 
employees via the enforcement of contractual obligations); see also James Gray Pope, Contract, 
Race, and Freedom of Labor in the Constitutional Law of “Involuntary Servitude,” 119 YALE L.J. 1474 
(2010) (arguing that the Thirteenth Amendment’s prohibition on involuntary servitude serves 
to guarantee egalitarian labor relationships). 
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contracts to pay bribes,230 contracts for certain kinds of disfavored medical 
procedures,231 contracts to pay gambling debts,232 and contracts to commit a 
tort233 will not be enforced. 
It is worth noting here that the market-based justification for contract 
deals with public-policy limitations on freedom of contract better than 
autonomy approaches like the promissory theories discussed above. For 
autonomy theories, public-policy exceptions represent a messy intrusion of 
foreign values into contract law. By refusing to enforce voluntary 
commitments, the law makes a kind of ad hoc compromise with the 
libertarian purity of contract. From a market perspective, however, such 
limitations flow naturally from the basic normative justification for contract 
law. In effect, contract law runs out at the point where its normative 
justification runs out. Our goal is not respect for personal autonomy per se 
but the moral goods provided by markets. When the enforcement of 
contracts fails to provide those goods, the justification for enforcing the 
contract also fails. 
C. CONTRACT LAW AND PRIMA FACIE JUSTIFICATION 
The limitations on the justificatory power of markets discussed in the 
previous two sections illustrate an important issue. Contract law is a residual 
or background category of law. By this I mean that it constitutes a kind of 
global default rule governing obligations arising from voluntary transactions. 
This does not mean, of course, that it applies to all voluntary transactions. 
Indeed, the central thesis of this Article is that, as a market-sustaining 
institution, we have reasons for confining the reach of contract law to 
market transactions. Rather, by “residual or background” I mean that 
contract law deals with a transaction unless some other body of law displaces 
it. Hence, for most market transactions, contract law is both logically and 
historically prior to the other bodies of law governing those transactions. 
Consider the example of employment contracts. Prior to the rise of modern 
employment law in the 1960s, the law of contracts governed most 
 
 230. See Sirkin v. Fourteenth St. Store, 108 N.Y.S. 830, 834 (App. Div. 1908) (“I think 
nothing will be more effective in stopping the growth and spread of this corrupting and now 
criminal custom [of commercial bribery] than a decision that the courts will refuse their aid to 
a guilty vendor or vendee . . . .”). 
 231. See In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1234 (N.J. 1988), superseded by statute, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 
9:3-46 (West 2002), as recognized in In re Adoption of Children by G.P.B., 736 A.2d 1277 (N.J. 
1999) (holding that surrogacy contracts violated the public policy of New Jersey and could not 
be enforced). But see Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 778 (Cal. 1993) (en banc) (holding that 
surrogacy contracts did not violate public policy). 
 232. See Cudahy Junior Chamber of Commerce v. Quirk, 165 N.W.2d 116, 118 (Wis. 1969) 
(refusing to enforce a wagering contract). But see FARNSWORTH, supra note 147, at 351 n.4 
(noting that under English common law gaming contracts were generally enforceable). 
 233. See Sayres v. Decker Auto. Co., 145 N.E. 744, 745 (N.Y. 1924) (holding that a contract 
to give a false bill of sale in order to defraud a third party was not enforceable). 
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employment relationships. With the passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act234 
and various other statutes designed to govern employment relations, 
however, contract law was displaced on certain issues. Contract, however, 
continues to operate in the interstices of employment law, providing the 
default rules when the more specialized body of law is silent. 
Contract’s status as a background body of law raises a number of 
interesting questions. First, there is the question of whether there are special 
reasons for favoring the more general principles of contract law over the 
more context-specific bodies of law such as employment law or the like.235 
Secondly, and for purposes of this Article more importantly, a defense of 
contract law needn’t provide a defense of contract law as the best regime to 
govern all transactions. Rather, it need only provide a prima facie defense of 
contract law. To be sure, the more robust one’s belief in the beneficent 
force of relatively unfettered markets, the more likely one is going to be 
suspicious of bodies of law that seek to displace market-sustaining regimes, 
such as contract law with more regulatory bodies of law. 
While I am sympathetic to criticisms of much of our current regulatory 
apparatus, however, nothing in the argument that I have offered in this 
Article requires such sympathy. In order for markets to justify contract law, it 
is enough that one is persuaded that markets are sufficiently valuable to 
provide a prima facie reason for legal support and that one is further 
persuaded that contract law does in fact provide such support. The fact that 
one believes that in some situations markets ought not to be supported does 
not defeat the basic thesis. It only means that in those circumstances we lack 
a reason for having contract law, and its support for the market in question 
ought to be withdrawn. 
Once it is recognized that contract law provides a set of background 
rules and that what is needed is a prima facie justification for the law, the 
case for viewing contract as a market-sustaining institution becomes 
stronger. Contractual liability is relatively easy to avoid by simply refusing to 
 
 234. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended at 42 
U.S.C. § 1981 (2006)). Of particular importance is Subchapter VI, Equal Employment 
Opportunities. 42 U.S.C. §§ 200e to -e-17. 
 235. Compare Nathan B. Oman, A Pragmatic Defense of Contract Law, 98 GEO. L.J. 77, 90–91 
(2009) (arguing that the generality of contract law solves pubic choice and information 
problems faced by more specialized bodies of law), with BRIAN H. BIX, CONTRACT LAW: RULES, 
THEORY, AND CONTEXT (2012) (criticizing contract theorists for focusing too much on the 
generality of contract law). See also Brian H. Bix, Mahr Agreements: Contracting in the Shadow of 
Family Law (and Religious Law)—A Comment on Oman’s Article, 1 WAKE FOREST L. REV. ONLINE 61, 
63–64 (2011), http://wakeforestlawreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/Forum_Bix. 
pdf (arguing that general contract law is poorly situated to police mahr agreements); Nathan B. 
Oman, Bargaining in the Shadow of God’s Law: Islamic Mahr Contracts and the Perils of Legal 
Specialization, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 579, 581–82 (2010) (arguing that the general law of 
contracts deals with Islamic marriage contracts better than the more specialized rules 
developed for prenuptial agreements); Nathan B. Oman, How To Judge Shari’a Contracts: A Guide 
to Islamic Marriage Agreements in American Courts, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 287, 319–31 (same). 
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engage in contracts. For that reason, it is not a body of law that is well suited 
for controlling or regulating behavior.236 This phenomenon is compounded 
by the fact that contract law’s reaction to undesirable contracts is relatively 
anemic. For example, rather than trying to suppress prostitution by 
punishing those who seek to purchase sex, contract law simply refuses to 
recognize meretricious contracts. Only through verbal and conceptual 
gymnastics, however, can this response be seen as a punishment or a 
sanction against prostitution. Rather, it is a withdrawing of support from that 
market. Instead of suppressing pathological markets, contract law tends to 
simply run out, refusing to act one way or the other. Such a stance is entirely 
consistent with the role of contract law as a market-supporting institution, 
and it is the way in which the value of markets provides a prima facie 
justification for contract. 
The argument offered in this Article is not libertarian. It is laudatory of 
markets and provides reasons for celebrating and protecting them. It is not, 
however, offered as a brief for radical free-market politics or anarcho-
capitalism. It may be consistent with such ideologies, but to say that markets 
are good is not to say that they are always good or that they are the only 
good. Rather, this Article is offered as a brief for contract law, a body of rules 
that provides a default regime supporting markets, but a regime that may be 
pushed aside when we decide that particular markets are not desirable. My 
goal is not to provide a set of arguments specifying the structure of society as 
a whole, only a set of arguments specifying the basic domain of contract law. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Markets provide the moral foundations for contract law. The 
widespread process of exchange does more than efficiently allocate 
resources. Indeed, it is far from clear that real-world markets result in the 
formally efficient allocation of resources. Markets do, however, perform a 
host of other morally valuable functions. They allow for widespread 
cooperation among those with often violently different religious and moral 
beliefs. They generate wealth, which not only decreases material suffering 
but is positively correlated with such desirable social outcomes as religious 
tolerance, better treatment of women and racial minorities, and greater 
concern for the natural world. The claim here is not that wealth is either a 
sufficient or a necessary condition for these outcomes. Rather, it is the more 
modest argument that wealth often shifts society in these directions and 
that, to the extent that markets facilitate this process even in part, they are to 
be desired. Finally, markets inculcate certain habits of mind and behavior 
that are to be desired. Given the benefits that flow from markets, we have 
 
 236. But see Jean Braucher, Contract Versus Contractarianism: The Regulatory Role of Contract 
Law, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 697, 699 (1990) (arguing that contract law serves to control and 
regulate contracting parties). 
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good reason for creating bodies of law that serve to sustain and strengthen 
markets. This is what contract law does. 
Looking at markets rather than directly at personal moral obligations, 
such as the duty to keep a promise, allows us to better navigate some basic 
theoretical problems that any system of contract law will face. It gives us an 
answer as to why promissory obligations are picked out from the universe of 
moral obligations for legal enforcement. They are favored not because we 
want to facilitate promise keeping but because doing so facilitates markets. It 
also gives us guidance as to which promises we want to enforce and the 
remedial structure of that enforcement. In each case, focusing on the moral 
obligation to keep a promise leads to confusion, while looking at markets as 
the goal of contract law provides a better guide to legal structure. Finally, 
the fact that in some circumstances markets can be pathological does not 
undermine this Article’s central thesis. It only means that in those areas we 
lack a reason for supporting markets through contract law, and accordingly, 
the law should be limited. In short, markets should be placed at the center 
of the justification of contract law. Contract is the law of the market. 
 
